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THESIS

A STUDY OF THE INTERNAL PUBLIC RELATIONS
PROGRAM IN THE U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET
AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

by

Charles W. Klee, Jr.

(A.B., University of Notre Dame, 1955)

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of The Requirements
For The Degree Of Master Of Science

BOSTON UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION
DIVISION OF PUBLIC RELATIONS

June, 1968

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PROGRAM IN THE U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET
AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

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An abstract of a thesis entitled

**A STUDY OF THE INTERNAL PUBLIC RELATIONS
PROGRAM IN THE U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET
AMPHIBIOUS FORCE**

Charles W. Klee, Jr.

**Boston University
School of Public Communication
Division of Public Relations**

June, 1968

Over the past several years the United States Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force has been faced with increasing losses of qualified enlisted men. In 1965 the Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force had more men leaving the Navy than any other Force in the Navy. Of particular concern was the high loss percentage of first term enlisted men. The Force was faced with a serious internal public relations problem. To combat the problem an internal public relations program was initiated throughout the Force under the title of the "Leadership Career Counseling Program."

This thesis studies the Leadership Career Counseling Program. It studies the background leading to the development of the program. It presents, through literature research, a basis for the importance and significance of public relations, particularly for the necessity of a good internal public relations in large organizations. The introduction of the program and its functions are presented. The current instructions concerning the program at each level of command within the Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force are studied. The Bureau of Naval Personnel program and the instructor training programs are also investigated. The research is concluded by conducting direct interviews with individuals concerned with the program. All levels of command are investigated. The interviews and findings are reported.

From the research the thesis attempts to illustrate how the Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force's internal public relations program functions. It compares command level thinking on the public relations program and problems with that of the enlisted man whom the program is attempting to retain. It attempts to illustrate communication channels, the effectiveness of these channels, and if the internal public relations program information passes through these channels. Finally, the thesis attempts to illustrate and develop public relations information which may be of value to the Navy and the public relations profession.

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CHAPTER 1

THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

Introduction

The citizens of the United States support a vast military system. The U.S. Navy is a significant part of this system. It is a complicated and costly organization to maintain.

With scientific and technological advancements being developed at near breakneck speed, the Navy finds itself in a nearly constant state of change as it tests and incorporates these innovations into the Fleet. With this growth, change and ever increasing world commitments, comes an ever increasing strain on the men who sail the ships of the Navy. Yet it seems that it is upon these men who sail the ships that the future success of the Navy depends. Regardless of the sophistication of new systems, it is still the man, the sailor, who is at the base of each endeavor. Former Secretary of the Navy Paul H. Nitze said of the sailor: "In the Navy as in all services, the most important part is the man. Everyone, seaman to admiral, has awesome responsibilities and arduous duties."¹

It appears however, that the Navy is having more problems with its men than with the new complex equipment and systems. The problem is in keeping qualified men in the Navy.

As an integral part of the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force is also faced with this problem. It is the

¹Paul H. Nitze, quoted in F. L. De Lorenzo, "The Second Class Citizen," Direction, (January, 1965), 5.

Investigation of this retention problem and the means which the U.S. Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force is using to meet the problem which is the subject of this study.

History, Purpose and Significance of the Amphibious Force.

The U.S. Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force came into existence on February 20, 1942 in Norfolk, Virginia when its first commander, Rear Admiral Roland M. Brainard, broke his flag aboard the transport USS Biddle.

Shortly after the Force was formed a flotilla of merchant ships manned by volunteers, Coast Guardsmen and merchant mariners embarked on the initial amphibious assault. This was the successful invasion of North Africa. Following the North Africa invasion the U.S. Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force successfully landed combat troops on the beaches of Salerno, Anzio, Sicily and Normandy. The Force's counterpart in the Pacific was equally as successful in pursuing the Japanese across the islands of the Pacific.

Since World War II, the Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force has attempted to stay abreast with modern technology and new concepts of war and amphibious assault. The increased use of the helicopter has resulted in the development of a helicopter assault procedure called "vertical envelopment." It allows troops and their equipment to be shuttled quickly from ship to battlefield by helicopter. With this new attack approach, new helicopter equipped ships have been introduced into the Force such as the Amphibious Assault Ship (LPH) and the Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD). Other ships in the Force include Command Flagships (AGC), Attack Transports (APA), Attack Cargo ships (AKA), Dock Landing ships (LSD), Tank Landing ships (LST), High Speed transports (APD) and

various repair, utility and landing craft. The Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force is made up of six squadrons of ships with approximately 10 ships to a squadron. The homeport for the Force is Norfolk, Virginia.

In addition to ships, the Force maintains an underwater demolition unit, a tactical air control group, naval beach group, troop training elements and the command and staff structures necessary to plan, train for and carry out the various phases of modern amphibious warfare. Teamed with the Force are units of the Fleet Marine Force who in combination are trained and organized to project seapower when and where needed.

Seapower is a projection of the nation's power. It has mobility over three-fourths of the world's surface. Any power on land can also be projected from the sea and brought to bear wherever circumstances dictate. Recent history seems to indicate that conventional warfare will be the nation's prime military instrument in securing world peace. The threat of nuclear weapons may serve well to prevent war but controlling various trouble spots about the world and suppressing hostilities will require the methods of conventional warfare. Of these methods, the use of the Amphibious Force is probably one of the most important military operations.

An amphibious warfare operation combines virtually all types of naval ships, aircraft and weapons in a concerted effort against a shore objective. The ability to conduct such operations effectively is a measure of a nation's military competence in applying and coordinating the elements of seapower. The amphibious operation exploits the element of surprise and capitalizes upon enemy weaknesses by application of the required type and degree of force at the right place at the right time. The mere existence of the Amphibious Force may cause some aggressive powers

extreme consternation because they know that United States troops can be delivered to nearly any trouble spot in the world within a matter of days. The actual presence of an amphibious force may induce an enemy to disperse or make wasteful efforts in attempting to defend his coastlines.²

Internal Public Relations Significance

With most of the Force's ships still of World War II vintage, a major problem is to avoid obsolescence while striving to introduce new ships and systems into the Force. A major goal is to achieve a 20 knot capability throughout the Force. While striving for the 20 knot Force is a pressing question, it seems that the retention of the Force's young 20 year old sailors is an even more serious problem. It seems that the Amphibious Force as well as the entire Navy has been experiencing a growing internal public relations problem that is quite costly and perhaps unnecessary. Captain F.L. De Lorenzo, a naval officer with broad public relations experience, interpreted the problem as follows:

Instead of treating our military men like second class citizens we should be doing everything we can to encourage him to make a career of the military. Today's soldier has more demands and responsibilities placed on him, by virtue of the technological and electronic advances in our weapons systems, than ever before. And yet, in spite of this intensive training, instead of making a military life more attractive to him, we are driving him out of the service and into the waiting arms of industry...

Each year more than 10,000 officers and 100,000 enlisted men leave the service...

This is a good part of why our annual Defense budget is in the neighborhood of 55 billion dollars...

And yet with all the advances and sophistication of our modern weapons systems, man is still the ultimate weapon,³

²"Seapower for Peace," Welcome Aboard USS Mountrail, (July 3, 1963), 1.

³F.L. De Lorenzo, "The Second Class Citizen," Direction, (January, 1965), 4-5.

Why men are leaving the Navy and what efforts are being made to retain them seems to be an important topic for those interested in internal public relations. This study will look at the internal public relations program of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force and its efforts to retain first term enlisted personnel in her ships.

In looking at internal public relations it seems that the chief concern should be with communication between men. It seems that the basis for misunderstanding between people may be centered about some form of communication breakdown. If men could clearly exchange all their ideas and feelings the need for internal public relation programs would probably be negligible. However, such exacting communications do not exist now and the barriers to understanding still present obstacles to man's social development. Dr. Daniel Katz, in discussing barriers to communication, said:

Accurate and adequate communication between groups and peoples will not in itself bring about the millennium, but it is a necessary condition for almost all forms of social progress. Physical barriers to communication are rapidly disappearing, but the psychological difficulties are in part a function of the very nature of language; in part they are due to the emotional character and mental limitations of human beings.⁴

The Navy now seems to be taking increased interest in the importance of internal public relations; that is, in the importance of open communication channels between all its members. Part of this realization was in the institution by the Secretary of the Navy of a Retention Task Force to study the retention problem and make recommendations

⁴Daniel Katz, "Psychological Barriers to Communication," quoted in Wilbur Schramm. Mass Communications. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1960, 316.

concerning it. This increased recognition by the Navy of public relations significance within the Navy may be evident from comments in a recent issue of Navy Times: "The Retention Task Force, headed by Rear Admiral John M. Alford, has shifted the focus of official attention to people, rather than hardware. It has, in the opinion of many observers, opened channels from the bottom to the top for communication of ideas and easing of personnel frustrations."⁵ This more liberal approach in dealing with human beings in the Navy now echoes the internal public relations interests of successful business. Robert Wood Johnson, Chairman of the Board of Johnson and Johnson, says: "No problem is greater or more urgent than that of establishing sound, cooperative relations between workers and management." ⁶

The breakdown in communication between men may take many forms. However, in the military, when human relations are attempted on the classical one-direction method of communication there seems to be the possibility for a great deal of misunderstanding. Whereas a military order is readily understandable, communication of subjects with varied aspects may result in varied reactions, emotions and behavior on the part of the receiver. There can be misunderstanding between the managerial level of the Navy and the enlisted personnel level. The result of this kind of communication could be an unnecessary breakdown in understanding which could result in failure to communicate re-enlistment information and advantages. The ultimate result could be loss of qualified men. Men may receive more incorrect or distorted information than correct

⁵Navy Times. (February 9, 1966), 5.

⁶Robert Wood Johnson, "Human Relations in Modern Business," quoted in Edward C. Bursk. Human Relations for Management, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956, 1.

information. Opinions may be formed without adequate knowledge. Dr. Daniel Katz recognizes this situation when he says:

...the human mind abhors the sense of helplessness that would result if it were forced to admit its inability to understand and deal with people and situations beyond its comprehension. What people do is to fill the gap with their own limited attitudes and ideas to cover all the world beyond their own knowledge.⁷

The question of why people do things or don't do things is one that will probably always confront man. In the Navy, as in business or any other organization where success is primarily dependent upon the skills of man, a part of this question will be concerned with why or why doesn't the man stay with the organization. Finding the answers to these questions and attempting to attain the best possible human relations can be the objectives of an internal public relations program.

The Navy has long recorded the need for internal public relations. U.S. Navy Regulations state: "The commanding officer shall use all proper means to promote the morale, and to preserve the moral and spiritual well-being of the personnel under his command."⁸ In commenting on this regulation, the U.S. Navy Public Information Manual says:

An imaginative and positive internal information program provides a prime means of compliance with this regulation. Heightened effectiveness of a good internal information program is measured through increased reenlistments, increased operational efficiency, higher morale, and decreased disciplinary problems.⁹

As described in the Navy Public Information Manual, the general internal information program, which includes the internal public relations

⁷Daniel Katz, op. cit., 322.

⁸U.S. Navy Regulations, 1948. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948, article 0709.1.

⁹U.S. Navy Public Information Manual. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955, 115.

program, is designed to coordinate the efforts of already established internal information components into an effective and dynamic internal information program. It says the program will utilize ship and station newspapers, service-wide periodicals, the Information and Education program, Career Appraisal Teams and personal contact, whenever possible, between the commanding officer and his men. It concludes by saying that with these components coordinated, the resulting program will be a dynamic one equipped to work for the good of the Navy, the command, and the individual.¹⁰

The objective of the internal information program, according to the manual, is to insure that each individual in the Navy, his dependents, and any civilian employees are fully and continually informed about the Navy, its purpose and future, with emphasis on their importance to the Navy. Specifically the program should provide personnel with all necessary and proper, primary and background information required to motivate the individual Navy man and his dependents toward a career in the Navy. It should also prepare them for discussions with military or civilian acquaintances.¹¹

An internal public relations program which is primarily interested in retention of qualified personnel is included in the information objectives of the Navy as a whole. It is an objective titled "Encouragement for career service." While all the information objectives of the Navy should be part of an internal public relations program, it appears that this objective is receiving more and more attention because

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid., 116.

of continued loss of personnel. The leading information objectives of the Navy regarding its obligation to inform the public and the personnel of the naval service are:

- a. Understanding of the continuing importance of seapower.
- b. Understanding of the Navy's role today.
- c. Understanding the Navy's future role.
- d. Encouragement for career service.
- e. A vigorous Naval Reserve.
- f. Public awareness of the need for a modernized fleet.
- g. Public awareness of growing Soviet naval strength.¹²

To varying degrees it seems that nearly all groups that depend primarily on people to sustain their activities are aware of the necessity of internal public relations. While some may simply pay lip service to the requirement others realize and engage in significant internal public relations programs. In any event, the significance of a good internal public relations program is recognized by many, regardless of whether or not it is carried out.

The Retention Problem

The U.S. Navy is continually faced with a retention problem. In recent years it has become more acute than previously. The retention problem is centered about the retaining of qualified enlisted personnel, particularly those men who are just completing their initial enlistment. Many authorities list a variety of reasons for the loss of these trained men. The costs of training new men is staggering. It is a first order problem that is getting increased attention throughout the Navy.

Government officials at all levels as well as the leaders in the

¹²Ibid., 3.

Fleet have taken notice of the problem and commented. Former Secretary of the Navy Paul H. Nitze in a speech delivered in 1964 said:

In the Navy one of every five enlisted men remain beyond their initial two to six years of obligated service. Last year in the Navy we discharged a total of 81,000 of these 'first termers,' and we had to replace them with new recruits. Under these circumstances the magnitude of our training loss is sobering.¹³

Secretary Nitze feels there are a variety of reasons for the retention problem. He feels that military pay is often inadequate; that Navy men are subjected to long separations from their families because of at-sea time; that military housing is both in short supply and often inadequate; that over the years there has been an erosion of military fringe benefits; and that a majority of Americans would not choose military service, except in time of war. Of all the reasons surrounding loss of enlisted personnel, he feels that pay is the most important. He says, "Pay is most important...Financial compensation must do what it implies--it must compensate to a greater extent than it now does for the unrelenting demands upon our servicemen."¹⁴

Greater compensation, linked with expectations of greater material gain, in civilian life is purported to be the chief cause of enlisted losses according to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. In 1964 Secretary McNamara said:

To remain in the military services in these times of cold war is a real sacrifice for highly trained, capable individuals. Their skills are such that in many cases they could expect far greater material awards from the civilian economy. While material gain is certainly not the primary motivation of

¹³Paul H. Nitze, (speech to Navy League, Washington, October 23, 1964), quoted in Direction, March, 1965, 10.

¹⁴Ibid.

those who make careers of the military service, our men and women in uniform are entitled to a standard of living commensurate with their abilities and the responsibilities we ask them to bear. I regret to say that they have not always had this.¹⁵

President Lyndon B. Johnson regards the retention problem as being centered about the question of social standing, including the many ramifications associated with a respected position in American society. In an address in August, 1964, President Johnson said: "I believe as I have often said that our country justly must and safely can accord to our American military men a place in our society long denied to soldiers throughout our history. I very much want our uniformed citizens to be first-class citizens in every respect. I want their wives and their children to know only first-class lives."¹⁶ Among the problems that may be at the root of the retention problem, President Johnson requested increased investigation of such matters as housing, medical care, and pay allowances.

The former Chief of Naval Operations feels that the greatest problem facing the Navy concerns what can be done to make a military career sufficiently attractive to persuade qualified young men to choose a service career. Admiral David L. McDonald, in discussing the problem, said: "I myself do not have the complete answer. More pay, less time away from home, more recognition--all would help."¹⁷

¹⁵Robert S. McNamara, (speech to American Legion Convention, Dallas, September 1964), quoted in Direction, March, 1965, 9.

¹⁶Lyndon B. Johnson, (speech to National and Industrial War Colleges, August, 1964), quoted in Direction, March, 1965, 9.

¹⁷David L. McDonald, (speech to Chicago Navy League, Chicago, Oct. 27, 1964) quoted in Direction, March, 1965, 11.

Regardless of the causes for the retention problem, the Fleet is still faced with the day-in and day-out problem of manning her ships with qualified enlisted personnel. It is a problem that has long faced the Fleet, but only in recent years has the retention problem become acute. It may be noted from the authorities cited previously that real concern over the loss of the Navy's qualified enlisted personnel came to the forefront in 1964. Whereas previously the Navy was able to man her ships despite personnel losses, it was fast becoming apparent that unless more men already in the Navy chose to re-enlist it might become necessary to extend enlistments. Such involuntary extensions in themselves would only add to an already existing and growing internal public relations problem. Resentment that might occur in those personnel who were involuntarily extended could easily carry over to other Navy men who might have been contemplating a Navy career. Perhaps a brief and concise summary of the situation is recorded in the foreward to the Navy's Career Counseling Guide. It is directed toward commanding officers and says:

The low reenlistment rate in the Navy, and its general causes are well known. As commanding officers you are faced with the day-to-day loss of key personnel and the effect their loss has on your operational readiness. You are acutely aware that recruits cannot take the place of trained men. Often it is not only the Navy which suffers, for many of the men who go out would actually be far better off to make the Navy a career.¹⁸

The retention problem is primarily centered around the loss of enlisted personnel at the end of their first enlistment. It has been seen through the years that if an enlisted man makes the choice to re-enlist, he has in most cases made a career choice. Therefore, the first-term

¹⁸U.S. Navy, Career Counseling Guide, NAVPERS 15878-A, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962, I.

enlisted man represents the primary area for retention efforts. As suggested earlier, the national and military leaders laid no specific cause for the loss of these enlisted men although such items as pay, absence from home and family, housing and general dissatisfaction with military life were among the possible reasons most frequently advanced.

At the close of fiscal year 1964 the Navy was experiencing one of its most serious personnel loss situations. The following figures represent the Navy's re-enlistment situation for the year ending July 31, 1964:¹⁹

Total enlisted strength	584,700
Enlistments expired or terminated	96,677
Not eligible or recommended for re-enlistment	26,308
Total eligible for re-enlistment	70,369
Total re-enlisted	15,822
Total eligible personnel that did not re-enlist	54,547

Of the 584,700 enlisted men in the Navy at the close of fiscal year 1964, approximately 400,000 were men serving on their first enlistments. With nearly 100,000 of these enlistments expiring or being terminated each year and only about 15,000 men re-enlisting, the consequences would seem to be a continually deteriorating personnel problem. While over 26,000 men were not eligible to re-enlist, usually for medical, disciplinary or performance reasons, there were still over 70,000 men eligible for re-enlistment. The fact that only 15,822 chose to try the Navy again points out that a severe personnel problem existed. If such a personnel problem were experienced by industry or in other private business, it is questionable

¹⁹U.S. Navy. Report by U.S. Naval School, Career Information and Counseling Course, Norfolk, Virginia, January 18, 1965.

whether the organization could survive. The financial investment losses alone would be of considerable proportions.

Personnel losses in the Navy are also an expensive item. It is considered that the absolute minimum investment in an enlisted man in the Navy is \$13,920. If this minimum figure is multiplied by the 54,547 men who did not re-enlist, it represents a total investment of \$759,294,240.²⁰

Total eligible personnel that did not re-enlist	54,547
Minimum investment per man	<u>\$ 13,920</u>
Total investment	\$ 759,294,240

Of the 54,547 eligible men who did not re-enlist approximately 21,000 were in positions designated by the Navy as "critical" rates. The term "critical" applies to military specialties to which one or more of the following conditions apply:

1. Long training time required.
2. High replacement cost involved.
3. A shortage of career petty officers exists in the specialty.
4. Low first term re-enlistment rates exist in the specialty.

Critical rates include such specialties as Electronics Technician, Fire-control Technician, Radarman and other highly specialized skills. Most of the critical ratings are connected with some form of electronics, although not necessarily. With the technological advances and changes within the Navy, the need for such specially trained men increases. However, there is also a demand for these skilled personnel in civilian positions. The competition for their services upon completion of their first enlistments is often quite keen. The immediate financial rewards in civilian occupations are usually higher than the Navy can hope to match, even in the

²⁰Ibid.

future. The result is the loss of many well trained specialists to civilian organizations. The dollars and cents loss to the Navy, which is naturally supported by the taxpayers, represents a considerable portion of the budget. The loss would probably be prohibitive to a private organization.

While critical ratings are important in the Navy, the general ratings are also essential to maintaining an operationally effective Fleet. During fiscal year 1964, over 33,000 men in the general ratings chose to leave the Navy. These were men who were well trained in a variety of mechanical, manual or administrative skills. Such ratings as Boatswain mate, Storekeepers and Yeomen are included under the general ratings. These men were not from the highly skilled critical rates which could leave the Navy for the lucrative positions in electronics or other highly specialized areas. Yet, they left the Navy.

By 1964 the Navy was realizing that a serious and continuing personnel problem existed within the service. In reviewing their records over the previous five years they could see that the quality of enlisted man that was sailing her ships was decreasing. It was not that the man was not potentially capable of being a proficient sailor, but rather that men were not staying in the Navy long enough to gain the necessary experience. By the time that they were trained and ready to assume greater responsibilities they were ready to leave the Navy. The result was that the experience level in the Navy dropped considerably. In 1959 the experience level for the Navy was 12.7 years. In 1964 the experience level was 5 years.²¹ The primary reason for the drop was the significant decrease in first term re-enlistments.

²¹Ibid.

The low re-enlistment rates in first term enlisted personnel can be seen in a review of U.S. Atlantic Fleet re-enlistment rates at the close of 1964. The following percentages represent the re-enlistment rates for first term enlisted personnel in the various Force's of the Atlantic Fleet from June through November 1964:²²

U.S. Atlantic Fleet Re-enlistment Rates, June-Nov., '64
for all First Term Personnel

Submarine Force	38%
Naval Air Force	14%
Service Force	13%
Mine Force	12%
Cruiser-Destroyer Force	10%
Amphibious Force	7%

U.S. Atlantic Fleet Re-enlistment Rates, June-Nov., '64
for First Term Personnel in Critical Rates

Submarine Force	43%
Naval Air Force	13%
Service Force	13%
Mine Force	12%
Cruiser-Destroyer Force	8%
Amphibious Force	4%

As the figures indicate, with the exception of the Submarine Force, the re-enlistment rates among first term enlisted personnel are low. Of all the Forces, the Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force showed the lowest re-enlistment rate for both overall re-enlistment and for critical rates

²²Ibid.

re-enlistment. At the close of 1964 the U.S. Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force was experiencing the lowest re-enlistment rate for first term personnel of major Force's in the Navy. The Amphibious Force was experiencing acute personnel shortages in attempting to adequately and effectively man all of her ships. Personnel were being transferred from ships scheduled for in-port time to ships leaving for extended operations such as Mediterranean and Caribbean deployments. Such transfers did little to stimulate re-enlistments. In short, the Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force was faced with a serious internal public relations problem.

Institution of a New Public Relations Program.

The general effects of low first term re-enlistments are:

1. The necessity for increased recruiting efforts, with its associated costs.
2. There is a small return on the training investment.
3. There is decreased operational readiness due to personnel instability and skill dilution.
4. An extra workload is placed on career personnel.

Because these effects were being felt plus the fact that it realized that a serious internal public relations problem existed within its organization, the U.S. Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force initiated a new public relations program within its own framework.

In early 1965, the Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force Commander initiated a major internal public relations program called the "Leadership Career Counseling Program." It was designed to improve retention of enlisted personnel in the Force. The main part of the program was the appointment and training of an officer, of department head rank, to serve as "Leadership Career Counseling Officer" (LCCO) on each ship in the Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force. His primary function was to work directly with enlisted

personnel in attempting to improve retention on each ship. He was to be assisted by trained enlisted career petty officers. In addition to attempting to retain enlisted personnel this group was to expand their work into a complete internal public relations program. In effect, a new internal public relations program was established within the Amphibious Force and within each ship of the Force.

This study will make a detailed investigation of this public relations program.

Description of Study Area

The first area will study the current program as it is described in Amphibious Force literature, instructions and notices.

Following study of the program as it is laid out in black and white, three major areas of study will be undertaken. The first area will be the internal public relations (LCCO) program as interpreted by the Amphibious Force Command personnel and their administrative assistants. This area will study the public relations program and retention problem as seen through the eyes of the Amphibious Force senior officers and policy makers, LCCO school instructors, commanding officers of ships, and the program administrators aboard ships.

A second area of study will investigate the Amphibious Force retention problem as seen by the Bureau of Naval Personnel in Washington. Since all major directives concerning personnel policies and programs are either instituted or approved at the Bureau level, an investigation into their policies seems appropriate.

The third area of study concerns the individual first term enlisted man, who is the subject of the public relations effort. The investigation seeks to determine whether the program is affecting these men; whether it

offers what they feel they need; whether the sailors who are leaving the Navy are giving all the reasons why they are leaving; whether there is clear communication between all members of the Force concerning the program. This section will attempt to look through the eyes of the enlisted man at the retention problem and at the public relations program aimed at his retention.

Three research techniques will be used during the study. They are:

1. Literature research and internal public relations program study. This includes a record and file search.
2. Direct interviewing.
3. Questionnaire utilization.

When research is completed the study will compare the data and hopefully determine the public relations program effect as an instrument in retaining enlisted personnel. It is hoped that public relations knowledge will be advanced by giving a clear picture of a new and challenging internal public relations program within a segment of the Navy. In any event, the thesis will attempt to make available all information found that may be of public relations significance to the Navy and the profession.

CHAPTER II

CURRENT PROGRAMS

Bureau of Naval Personnel Program

The Enlisted Retention Program is provided as a basic guide for all Navy commands by the Bureau of Naval Personnel. The Enlisted Retention Program is set forth in the Bureau of Naval Personnel Instruction 1133.3 series.²³ The current instruction is addressed to all ships and stations in the Navy.

The purpose of the Bureau of Naval Personnel program is to:

1. Reemphasize the need to reenlist qualified enlisted personnel.
2. To assist commands in organizing an effective retention program.
3. To stress the importance of career counseling in retaining enlisted personnel.

The Bureau of Naval Personnel established an organizational system for conducting the program. The Bureau stressed that an effective retention program is dependent on an effective organization and responsibility at all levels of command. The Fleet and Type Commander staffs were determined to be a likely organizational system from which to conduct the program. As a result, "Retention/Leadership Development" billets were established on these staffs. These new Retention/Leadership Development staff personnel were given responsibility for the following:

1. Being a focal point for information and material concerned with retention and leadership development.
2. Keeping in close contact with subordinate commands to ensure effective retention efforts.

²³U.S. Navy. Bureau of Naval Personnel Instruction 1133.3 F (current instruction), Department of the Navy, May 5, 1965.

3. Monitoring enlisted retention program efforts and their reports.

4. Keeping in contact with Enlisted Personnel Distribution Offices and the Bureau of Naval Personnel to ensure expeditious handling of re-enlistment and retention matters.

The Bureau of Naval Personnel emphasizes the necessity for positive action in order to establish a dynamic retention and career counseling program. The program is aimed primarily at first term enlisted men. The primary method of attempting to retain these men in the Navy is through career counseling. To accomplish this counseling, the Bureau directs that each command shall have at least one qualified enlisted career counselor aboard. A counselor is considered qualified if he has successfully completed a career counseling school or has had extensive previous experience. In addition to the career counselor, a senior career petty officer who has been trained, is a strong leader, and is career motivated is to be assigned to each shipboard division as an enlisted counselor.

While counseling is strongly stressed, the Bureau also emphasizes that strong leadership, at all levels, must accompany the counseling program. In discussing this point the Bureau of Naval Personnel Enlisted Retention Program instruction says:

It must be emphasized that this organization alone will not suffice. The division officer, junior division officer and leading petty officer must be inspired to wholeheartedly assume their inherent responsibilities as advocates of career service in the Navy. These personnel must have the basic knowledge and skills of our personnel management systems.²⁴

The Bureau program calls for personnel counseling interviews on a planned basis. The subject matter for these interviews is designed to

²⁴Ibid.

ensure that the interviewees have full knowledge of all career benefits. Five interviews are scheduled during a normal first enlistment. The first interview is conducted when the man reports aboard. Following interviews are conducted at 1½ years of service, at 3 years of service, at 6 months prior to expiration of obligated service and the final interview is conducted upon the man's re-enlistment or upon being separated from the Navy.

A record of these interviews is maintained on a standard Navy Report of Re-enlistment Interviews form called a NAVPERS 736 form. The form is submitted to the Bureau of Naval Personnel after all interviews have been completed. It is used for record, statistical and planning purposes.

The Bureau of Naval Personnel provides retention aids which include schools, pamphlets, counselor guides and kits, an information sheet called Career Information Newsletter, and instructions related to retention programs.

The Amphibious Force Program

The Amphibious Force Program follows the guidelines set forth by the Bureau of Naval Personnel. The basic outline and instructions concerning the Amphibious Force Leadership Career Counseling Program are presented in the Amphibious Force Type Administration Manual.²⁵

The emphasis of the program is placed primarily on sound and effective leadership and counseling. In the opening statement concerning the program it says, "It is the policy of COMPHIBLANT to insure that the best possible methods are used in developing and revitalizing naval leadership in all its aspects; inspirational, technical, and moral."²⁶

²⁵U.S. Navy. Commander Amphibious Force Type Administration Manual (CPLINST P 5000.1 E). Little Creek, Virginia: Amphibious Force Printing Office, 1965, 1-10--1-13.

²⁶Ibid.

The broad objectives of the Leadership Career Counseling Program are:

1. To substantially improve the re-enlistment rate of qualified enlisted personnel. This is to be accomplished primarily by:
 - a. Counseling each man as to his best suited career path.
 - b. Ensuring that each man is well informed regarding the benefits, rights and opportunities available to both himself and/or his dependents.
 - c. To foster a feeling of pride in belonging to a vital and superb part of the armed forces--the Amphibious Force.
 - d. Establishing and recording the reasons why men do or do not re-enlist. At the same time, efforts should be made to correct deficiencies while building up the favorable aspects of a Navy career.
2. To emphasize that successful leadership is based on personal example and moral responsibility.
3. To require personal command attention in the supervision and training of subordinates, both officer and enlisted.
4. To strive to make every man in the Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force an example of military ideals.

The procedures outlined for attaining these objectives direct all units of the Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force to establish and carry out a Leadership Career Counseling Program. All units are further directed to:

1. Assign the Department Head best qualified for the job as the unit's Leadership Career Counseling Officer. The function is assigned as a collateral duty in addition to the regular duties of the officer. The LCCO is to work directly under the Executive Officer. The Executive Officer retains primary responsibility for the program. It is mandatory that the LCCO attend the "Enlisted Personnel Administration and Counseling Course (officers)" that is conducted at the Naval Schools Command on the Norfolk Naval Station.

2. Ensure that junior officers are qualified prior to being assigned as a division officer. Commanding officers are responsible for this qualification.

3. Have at least one properly motivated, high caliber petty officer from each department designated as an Enlisted Career Counseling Petty Officer (ECCPO). Prior to being designated, these petty officers must be recommended by the LCCO and attend the three weeks Career Information and Counseling Course at the Naval Schools Command on the Norfolk Naval Station or the newly established Phiblant Career Information and Counseling Course offered at the Naval Amphibious Schools Command at Little Creek, Virginia.

4. Utilize Bureau of Naval Personnel enlisted retention instructions and Career Counseling Guide as the basis for the promotion of an effective Leadership Career Counseling Program.²⁷

The duties of each LCCO direct that he work under the Executive Officer and maintain close contact with department heads and division officers in guiding the unit's leadership program. He is responsible for ensuring day to day continuity of the program. He is further directed to ensure that his unit program:

1. Includes both technical and moral principles and practices of leadership.
2. Includes training sessions dealing with responsibility.
3. Provides for assignment of qualified petty officers to fill the quotas at leadership schools.
4. Employs graduates of leadership schools in active roles in the unit's leadership efforts.

²⁷Ibid.

5. Employs materials and methods of leadership instruction that are best suited to the unit's needs.

6. Provides effective career counseling on the benefits, rights and opportunities available to enlisted personnel and their dependents, as well as individual career guidance.

The LCCO is responsible for maintaining an adequate library of reference material pertinent to the units career counseling efforts. He must also ensure that a suitable space is available to Enlisted Career Counseling Petty Officers for counseling and interviewing. He is responsible for the selection of the ECCPO's and must ensure that only high caliber, motivated, mature petty officers are assigned. The LCCO is also directed to maintain close liaison with the Force Leadership/Retention Officer and to submit copies of completed enlisted interview forms to him.

The duties of the Enlisted Career Counseling Petty Officer (ECCPO) direct him to perform career counseling work for the enlisted personnel in his department under the supervision of the LCCO and division officer. Generally, these duties include:

1. Conducting interviews as outlined by the Bureau of Naval Personnel enlisted retention instructions and the Career Counseling Guide.

2. Conducting individual and group counseling of enlisted personnel on the benefits, rights, and opportunities available to the man and his family.

3. Conduct individual counseling of personnel directed toward career path guidance.

4. Keeping the LCCO and division officer advised on recurrent matters that have a detrimental effect on the crew's morale.

The above instructions are the basic framework upon which each unit in the Amphibious Force bases its program.

All of these units have access to the Force LCCO. He is designated as the Leadership Development/Enlisted Retention Officer but more commonly called the Force LCCO.

The Force LCCO is a career officer with the rank of Lieutenant. The present Force LCCO is an officer with over 20 years of naval service. He has previously served as an enlisted man prior to being commissioned as an officer. It appears that officers with enlisted service experience are selected for this position. The rationale for this is that such officers may have a keener understanding of enlisted personnel situations and problems.

The Force LCCO or Leadership Development/Enlisted Retention Officer is assisted by a Chief Petty Officer who has had broad experience in career counseling. These two men work closely together. They devote their entire work activity to the Amphibious Force LCCO program. There are no other personnel in the Force LCCO office or on the Amphibious Force Staff directly associated with the program.

The function of the Force LCCO and his assistant is primarily to assist the various units of the Force with their LCCO programs. This is accomplished primarily by two methods. First, any unit may ask for assistance. This is usually made in the form of an informal request. The Force LCCO staff will visit the unit and attempt to render the desired assistance. The second method is through a system of Force LCCO initiated visits. These visits amount to an informal inspection of the units program. Each Force unit receives several of these visits each year. Both the Force LCCO and the Chief Petty Officer make the visit.

The visit usually lasts about two hours. During this time, on an average ship visit, the Force LCCO will discuss the program with the Executive Officer and the LCCO. He will utilize any information previously sent to him by the command, such as copies of interview forms. He will attempt to ascertain just how the program functions on the supervisory level. During this same period, the Chief Petty Officer will be talking with the ship's enlisted career counseling personnel (ECCPO's). The Chief Petty Officer has the task, and usually the opportunity, to see just how the program is operating at the grassroots level. He attempts to ascertain exactly how the particular ship's program functions. He is particularly interested in determining career counselor motivation, subject knowledge and the general cooperation atmosphere and patterns aboard the ship. Since this portion of the visit is conducted solely between enlisted personnel it is hoped that frank evaluations can be made between the staff and the ship. Possible barriers to communication caused by officer rank influence may be reduced using this method.

The Chief Petty Officer will also conduct an open floor discussion of the program and related retention subjects with the ECCPO's. Particular attention will be placed on discussing the attributes and problems of the particular ship's program. He will tie in any Force problems that are also noted in that ship. He will point out any unique features he has seen and will note them for use in advising other ships. He will conclude by making recommendations for improving the program, especially at the ECCPO level.

Following their individual group discussions, the Force LCCO and the Chief Petty Officer meet alone and discuss the ship's program. They then visit the Commanding Officer of the ship and advise him of their findings,

both pro and con. They offer recommendations for improving the program aboard that particular ship. This meeting with the Commanding Officer of the ship concludes the visit.

There are no visit reports involved. By eliminating reports to higher authority it is hoped that units will discuss all aspects of their program, particularly those parts where they are experiencing difficulties or are unsuccessful. While no formal reports are made, the Force Leadership Development/Enlisted Retention Officer does make a monthly visit to the Admiral (Commander Amphibious Force Atlantic) and verbally advises him of the general progress of the program within the Amphibious Force.

In summary it may be said that the primary task of the Force Leadership Development/Enlisted Retention Officer (Force LCCO) and his assistant is to visit units of the Amphibious Force to discuss their LCCO program and aid them in any way possible in improving their programs. During these informal visits the Force LCCO staff is primarily interested in:

1. Talking about the program with all personnel concerned with the program, particularly the counselors.
2. Determining command backing of the program, general cooperation patterns and leadership patterns.
3. Finding their problems.
4. Assisting them, particularly in solving their problems.
5. Advising the Commanding Officer of what they have observed and making recommendations for his consideration.
6. Emphasizing that any changes must come from within the command itself.

The Amphibious Group Program

There are two Amphibious Groups in the Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force. Each Group is commanded by a Rear Admiral. He has an adequate

staff to assist him. Each Group Commander is responsible for approximately half the Amphibious Force surface units. This represents three squadrons of ships and a Landing Ship Tank (LST) Division.

The program of the Amphibious Group investigated for this study is primarily one of emphasizing the Force LCCO program. Much emphasis is placed on command participation and support. Commander Amphibious Group Two's (COMPHIBGRU TWO) program consolidated their former Re-enlistment program with the LCCO program. In effect, the Group is placing added emphasis on re-enlistment efforts through the LCCO program.

By instruction, Commander Amphibious Group Two states, "This program requires intensive and continuing command effort. COMPHIBGRU TWO will monitor this program for all units of Amphibious Group Two, analyze the results, and make recommendations when necessary."²⁸

On the staff of Commander Amphibious Group Two is an officer who serves as the Group LCCO. He is responsible for advising the Group Commander on the effectiveness and attainments of the program. He is also available to members of the Group for assistance, if they request it. Direct liaison with the Group LCCO is authorized to avoid unnecessary delays in communication.

While the Group LCCO is available for assistance, he is not generally called upon by ships of the Force because the Force LCCO is usually readily available. Should the Group staff ever be deployed more frequently with units of the Force his assistance would probably be utilized to a greater extent. While in home port however, he serves primarily as a re-enforcer of the program and as an advisor to the Group Commander.

²⁸U. S. Navy. Commander Amphibious Group Two Instruction 5390.2, February 27, 1965.

The Amphibious Group Two program requires that all subordinate units submit copies of the Report of Re-enlistment Interviews form to the Group Commander. Also, a quarterly LCCO and re-enlistment report is required. The report primarily seeks re-enlistment statistics and LCCO program methodology information. The report calls for the following information:

1. Retention statistics. (re-enlistment rates, counselors assigned and number of re-enlistment interviews conducted)
2. Report of any unique innovations on program methods that are considered significant and of interest to other units.
3. Recommendations on improving personnel retention rates.²⁹

The Amphibious Squadron Program

There are six squadrons in the Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force. Each squadron is commanded by a senior Navy Captain who is referred to as the "Commodore." Like the Group Commander, the Commodore has his own staff. A Squadron Commander usually has 6 to 10 ships in his squadron.

The squadron program investigated for this study used the Force and Group instructions as the sole written instructions for the program. There were no written squadron instructions or notices to in anyway modify the standing program instructions. Administrative communication was not interrupted at the Squadron Commander level. However, the Commodore does use squadron conferences and personal meetings with his commanding officers to emphasize the program and voice his wishes.

The squadron also has an officer who is designated as the staff LCCO. He is available to ships of the squadron for assistance and advice. His

²⁹Ibid.

services can be used when the squadron is deployed or not in home port. However, the Force LCCO is the chief source of information and assistance when the squadron is in home port. The staff LCCO also acts as an advisor to the Squadron Commander on matters pertaining to the program.

Ship Programs

The Amphibious Force afloat force consists of over 60 ships. Six ships were visited by the investigator for the purpose of examining their general program. All six ships are conducting their programs along the basic guidelines set forth by the Force Commander.

Each ship administers the program under the Executive Officer. On one small ship the Commanding Officer executed the duties of program administrator. Each ship had an appointed LCCO and ECCPO's. However, no ship visited had the required number of qualified ECCPO's aboard. The required number is at least one ECCPO from each department.

Each ship stressed the counseling aspect of the program. In all instances, the personal interview with the enlisted man was the main method of communication. For the most part, the ECCPO's conducted the interviews. The most successful method for scheduling and ensuring completion of interviews appeared to be by the "tickler card" method. Names of all appropriate individuals are listed on cards and placed in a dated file according to when the individual is due to be interviewed. The file is reviewed daily or frequently by the LCCO or ECCPO's to determine the interview schedule. Generally, interviewees were given sufficient notice of an approaching interview to avoid any conflict of schedules. Department heads and division officers were found to be generally cooperative in assisting the program.

Some ships use the "Plan of the Day" as a vehicle for presenting career information to all members of the crew. The "Plan of the Day" is

a daily publication put out on each ship to list the daily schedule of events. There is also a section on the publication for presenting general information.

Career information material is available on each ship. Most ships have displays of career information material posted on bulletin boards, on mess decks, or in recreational and crews lounge areas. Such techniques as audio-visual aids, guest speakers, specific program expert speakers, and alike aids are sometimes utilized by ships as part of their program.

However, the personal interview is still the chief method of conveying career information. Most ECCPO's follow the counseling suggestions provided in the Career Counseling Guide.

Some ships faithfully complete and submit the Report of Re-enlistment Interviews forms required by the program instructions while other ships do not.

While this is the formal administrative method carried out by most ships for developing their LCCO program, many ships also have an informal method. This method is usually directed toward a sub-group of the eligible group of enlisted personnel. This sub-group is usually a small group of individuals which the ECCPO's appear to approach with added zeal. Whether the ECCPO's spend more time with these individuals because they like them, feel they are genuinely helping them, are ego-motivated to re-enlist them, or for some other reason, could not be determined by the investigator. The matter could be the subject of further research. However, there does appear to be both a formal program and an informal program on some ships. The informal program is carried on day to day as is the formal program. However, it goes beyond the formal interview system. It concentrates on a few individuals who are informally approached

by the ECCPO's on the subject of making the Navy a career. These meetings take place nearly anywhere, at any time. In general, they are spontaneous. The discussions are usually on a very friendly and informal basis.

Regardless of the formality of the ship program, all ships investigated basically prepared and conducted their programs along the guidelines set forth by the Force instructions. Almost every ship had some practices unique to that particular ship. Examples of this were: varied group presentations; use of audio-visual aids; speakers programs; and similar activities. The Force LCCO is cognizant of these practices and encourages innovations which might improve the program. Successful innovations and approaches are conveyed to others through the Force LCCO's visits to other ships.

School Training Programs

There are two school training programs used by the Amphibious Force to train counselors and Leadership Career Counseling Officers. One school system is directed and controlled by the Bureau of Naval Personnel and the other is directed and controlled by the Naval Amphibious School Command.

The Bureau of Naval Personnel Schools

Amphibious Force Leadership Career Counseling Officers attend the "Enlisted Personnel Administration and Counseling Course (Officers)" which is a two week course conducted at the U.S. Naval Station, Norfolk, Virginia. Officers from any of the Forces in the Navy may attend this school. It is a course directed primarily toward training division officers. The school provides a background in personnel administration, career opportunities, and counseling techniques designed to effectively counsel enlisted personnel regarding a naval career. Some examples of class subjects are: enlisted personnel retention problems; advancement

in rating system; pay and allowances; retirement benefits; survivor benefits; dependents medicare program; Navy Schools; selective training and retention (STAR) program; rating conversion programs; nuclear power programs; programs leading to a commission; educational programs; re-enlistment incentives; sea/shore rotation; enlisted service records; re-enlistment programs; and enlisted personnel counseling.

A second school directed and controlled by the Bureau of Naval Personnel and used by the Amphibious Force as part of retention program training is the "Career Information and Counseling School (Enlisted)". This school is also located on the Naval Station at Norfolk, Virginia. It is also open to enlisted personnel from any part of the Navy. The Amphibious Force uses the school to train enlisted petty officers to be Enlisted Career Counseling Petty Officers (ECCPO's). It is a three week course and is specifically directed toward training career counselors. The course covers much of the information discussed in the officer's course but places added emphasis on counseling. Students practice counseling while attending the school. They are exposed to more detailed counseling problems and techniques. Upon successful completion of the course graduates are designated as qualified career counselors. A notation to that effect is placed in the counselors service record.

The Amphibious Force School

In June, 1966, the U.S. Naval Amphibious School Command at Little Creek, Virginia initiated its own retention program course called "Phiblant Career Information and Counseling Course." The course is quite similar to the enlisted course directed by the Bureau of Naval Personnel. However, the Amphibious School course is controlled by the Amphibious Force and is of two weeks duration. It is attended only by petty officers of the

Amphibious Force who are training to be ECCPO's. While the Bureau of Naval Personnel course is still used and recommended, the new Amphibious course is serving as a valuable adjunct to the retention program by making available more school seats for training ECCPO's. Nearly all units of the Force are in need of more trained counselors and this school helps provide them. Also, by having their own school the Force can more readily adjust school quotas to facilitate training of counselors on ships that have uncertain operational schedules.

Class subjects are similar to the other schools. As in the Bureau of Naval Personnel school, counseling is given the most class time. Nearly five days of school are devoted to counseling and interviewing methods and training.

Upon successful completion of the school a graduate is considered qualified to serve as a career counselor by the Type Commander. The Bureau of Naval Personnel will designate a graduate of the school as a qualified career counselor after he has had six months counseling experience and is recommended by his Commanding Officer.

CHAPTER III

EVALUATION OF THE PROGRAM BY INTERESTED PARTIES

This section of the study is concerned with the opinions and statements of individuals who are actively engaged in the LCCO program or are concerned with some aspect of it.

Direct interviews were conducted with 73 individuals to ascertain their understanding of the program. Particular emphasis was placed on developing reasons why first term enlisted personnel choose to re-enlist or leave the Navy. Ideas concerning program goals and strong and weak points of the program were investigated.

Interviews were conducted with two broad groups of individuals. One group consisted of Amphibious Force command, policy-making and administrative personnel. The other group was made up of enlisted personnel from ships of the Amphibious Force.

The command, policy-making and administrative group included the Commander of an Amphibious Group, staff representatives for Commander Amphibious Force Atlantic, an Amphibious Squadron Commander and members of his staff, Commanding Officers, Executive Officers, Leadership Career Counseling Officers and counselors of Amphibious Force ships, and school instructors and administrators. This group was selected because it encompasses an overall picture of the Amphibious Force, its leadership, and the LCCO program leaders within the Force. It includes senior officers and senior staff members, both of whom are policy-makers and leaders. It provides a representative sample of typical ships and leaders in the Force. It samples the school program administrators and instructors who develop and present the school training for the program.

In all, 23 command, policy-maker and administrative level interviews were conducted. These 23 individuals were interviewed concerning their interpretations of the program and their ideas on causes for the retention situation. Five questions formed the basic format for the interviews. These questions were:

1. Why are enlisted men, especially first term personnel in the Amphibious Force, leaving the Navy?
2. Why are some first term personnel re-enlisting?
3. What are the primary goals of the LCCO program?
4. Does the program know and serve the need of the sailor satisfactorily?
5. What are the strong and weak points of the program?

The second group of individuals interviewed were enlisted men. Nearly all men interviewed were first term enlisted men with over one year of naval service. The interviewees were all stationed aboard Amphibious Force ships. The sample was taken from the eligible personnel aboard various type ships to afford a typical representation of the Force afloat. Five ships were utilized for the interviews. The enlisted personnel were serving aboard the following type ships: An Attack Transport (APA), two Attack Cargo ships (AKA), a Landing Ship Dock (LSD), and a Landing Ship Tank (LST).

A total of 50 interviews were conducted with enlisted personnel. These 50 individuals were interviewed concerning their interpretations of the retention problem and the reasons for it. Six questions formed the basic format for the interviews. These questions were:

1. Why are some men leaving the Navy?
2. Why are some men re-enlisting?

3. Has anything been said to you aboard ship regarding a Navy career?
4. What seem to be the main advantages and disadvantages of re-enlisting?
5. What would be necessary to have more men re-enlist?
6. What do you feel the Navy has done for you and where do you feel it has let you down?

Following each interview the interviewee was asked to complete a brief questionnaire type test. The questions were designed to test the individuals' knowledge of some basic Navy programs, incentives, and benefits which are covered and presented in the LCCO program. The test consisted of 6 multiple choice questions and 6 true and false questions.

The interviewer wore civilian attire and introduced himself as a graduate student seeking research information for a public relations thesis. All interviews were conducted during the week of June 6, 1966 in Norfolk, Virginia. Interviews were conducted during normal work hours at the interviewees duty station. Interviews were conducted in private for the purpose of avoiding possible biased replies because of the presence of an associate. Most interviews were completed in 20 minutes or less. Interviews were held in a polite yet formal manner in order to elicit thoughtful and sincere responses. The interviewer did not represent himself as a member of the military. No military considerations were presented and a relaxed interview atmosphere with free discussion of the subject was generally attained.

Evaluation of Amphibious Force Command, Policy-Makers, and Administrative Personnel

Many interviewees did not wish to be identified by name, but did not object to being described by rank, position, experience, or other back-

ground information. The 23 Command, policy-maker and administrative personnel are therefore described in such manner. For description purposes officer interviews are listed as Interview O-1, O-2, etc. Brief descriptions of the interviewee follow each interview identification number.

Answers to interview questions are recorded as A, B, C, D, E, (F).*

Briefly restated these are answers to the following questions:

- A. WHY ARE ENLISTED MEN LEAVING THE NAVY?
- B. WHY ARE SOME MEN RE-ENLISTING?
- C. WHAT ARE THE PRIMARY GOALS OF THE LCCO PROGRAM?
- D. DOES THE PROGRAM SERVE THE NEEDS OF THE SAILOR?
- E. WHAT ARE THE STRONG AND WEAK POINTS OF THE PROGRAM?
- F. OTHER COMMENTS.**

Interview O-1. (Rank of Captain; Commanding Officer of an attack cargo ship (AKA); U.S. Naval Academy graduate; World War II service; previous duty in Amphibious Force as an Executive Officer.)

A. (1) They are young men. This is their first exposure to discipline. They want to get away from this discipline and be on their own. (2) They think they can do better on the outside. They want to give it a try.

B. (1) Some men like this discipline and way of life. (2) Some men find a place in life in the Navy. It is different from home. They find it more attractive than anything they have previously experienced.

*Interview questions will not be repeated for each interview.

**Responses follow the letter designators for each question. Replies are reduced and paraphrased to provide a brief resume of each interview. The context remains the same and all replies may be considered as quotes.

C. The goal is to increase re-enlistments by having a higher level department head in charge of re-enlistments. His experience and knowledge is valuable.

D. Yes. The program points out opportunities to some enlisted men that would otherwise be unknown to him. It helps him re-enlist. The program is a substitute for qualified division officers.

E. Strong points--It shows opportunities to the enlisted man. An enlisted career counselor can establish better rapport with enlisted men. There is no officer influence. The enlisted man has freedom to talk. Weak points--The work load aboard ship makes it difficult to maintain a continuous program.

Interview 0-2. (Rank of Commander; Executive Officer of an attack cargo ship (AKA); a career reserve officer; heavy experience in administrative and personnel assignments.)

A. (1) Regimentation. Some men just don't adapt to military life. (2) Separations from family.

B. Some men are drifting with the tide. There is nothing better for them in sight. They do not make up their minds not to get out of the Navy, so they re-enlist. Some have no definite goals. They are indecisive.

C. The goal is to re-enlist people.

D. Yes. It helps the drifter make up his mind.

E. Strong points--It gives career information. It can provide goals. Weak points--Too much reliance is placed in the program. The program may by-pass the division officer. The division officer and the leading petty officer are the primary LCCO's.

Interview 0-3. (Rank of Lieutenant Commander; LCCO aboard an attack cargo ship (AKA); primary duty is Operations Officer; a career naval officer with over 16 years experience.)

A. (1) Many men have made plans for outside the Navy. (2) Many are just serving their military obligation. They never intended to stay in the Navy. (3) Many are immature and haven't settled down. They want to try other things.

B. (1) They haven't had other definite plans. (2) They like the Navy. The restrictions are not severe. Officers are not too tough.

C. The goal is to re-enlist people through an honest re-enlistment program.

D. Yes.

E. Strong points--There is honesty in presenting information and future possibilities to the sailor. The enlisted counselors can do the ground work for decision making. Weak points--The program needs time, space and trained people. They are not available. They are needed if you want to carry out the overall mission of the program.

Interview 0-4. (Rank of Lieutenant Commander; Commanding Officer of a tank landing ship (LST); previous experience in Amphibious Force.)

A. (1) There is no glamor in the Amphibious Force. The nature of the work is not glamorous. The Force has old, unattractive, and slow ships. (2) The Amphibs are hard to sell. (3) Some men are just not suited for military life.

B. (1) They have a good ship. They have pride in ship and duty. (2) The Variable Re-enlistment Bonus is a new reason. (3) Re-enlistment option incentives attract some.

C. Shipping people over is the main goal. Keeping trained personnel in the Navy is the goal.

D. Yes. The program makes benefits known.

E. Strong points--It makes information available to the men. Weak points--There is excessive pressure from above.

F. Pay is not the important reason for re-enlisting or losing men, regardless of what others say.

Interview 0-5. (Rank of Lieutenant; Executive Officer of a tank landing ship (LST); previous experience as a department head in an LST.)

A. (1) Long family separations. (2) The man is not motivated. He takes no pride in a Navy career. (3) Low pay. (4) Long work hours due to reduced personnel available to do the work. (5) Frozen rates prevent advancement in some cases.

B. (1) Some men feel they want to be professional military men. They are interested in the military. (2) Security and the retirement program. (3) Some men re-enlist for a few key programs.

C. Re-enlistments.

D. No comment.

E. Strong points--It educates personnel. It makes them aware of the advantages of a Navy career. Weak points--Small ships have difficulty in meeting personnel demands. It is hard to even meet school quotas. It makes for even harder work for the crew while other personnel are being trained in school. Also, the mission of the ship must come first. Staff personnel often recommend programs without thinking of the implications on smaller ships.

Interview 0-6. (Rank of Lieutenant (JG); LCCO aboard a tank landing ship (LST); a reserve officer who is seeking post-graduate education through the Navy post-graduate program; his decision concerning a Navy career will be based on the outcome of the post-graduate school selection list.)

A. (1) The erratic performance expected from day to day of the sailor. There are too many "big flaps," such as preparing the ship for the visit of

the Admiral. The Admiral seldom visits the ship. (2) Junior officers make mistakes. Their mistakes with men lead to lack of interest in a Navy career. (3) The men don't have much good to say about the Navy. The man may see some good in the Navy but he doesn't apply it to himself. He goes along with the crowd. (4) Military restrictions.

B. The Variable Re-enlistment Bonus.

C. Re-enlistments.

D. The program serves the needs of the man concerning information about staying in the Navy. It does not serve his needs about providing information about getting out. It should not necessarily do this however.

E. Strong points--Just having someone to talk to about re-enlistment benefits is a strong point. Weak points--Interviews are often on a mandatory basis. Counselors often don't have time to spend on the program.

Interview 0-7. (Rank of Captain; Commanding officer of an attack transport (APA); U.S. Naval Academy graduate; previous command experience; over 20 years service experience; previous amphibious Force experience.)

A. Some men are just serving their military time. They are not interested in a military career.

B. (1) They are satisfied in their job. (2) The total benefits of a Navy career. (3) Some rates, such as Electronic Technicians, are offered an attractive life in the Navy. (4) The single man can travel and gain experience.

C. Re-enlist individuals.

D. Yes.

E. Strong points--It systematically releases information to enlisted men on service benefits. It uses the "old timer" to do the main selling job. Weak points--There are lots of other things that sell besides the LCCO program. An example is everyday petty officer leadership. The

program doesn't need overemphasis. Time is a problem as well as loss of experienced petty officers.

Interview 0-8. (Rank of Lt (jg); LCCO aboard an attack transport (APA); a reserve officer with just over two years of service; has spent all of his naval time aboard same ship.)

A. (1) The men are disenchanted with the Navy. They don't know what they are doing the next day. They cannot make plans. Plans are often disrupted by the unexpected.

B. (1) Lower caliber of personnel see the Navy as a better opportunity than what is available outside. (2) Men like the responsibility they can have in the Navy. (3) Some men enjoy the Navy. (4) Others have no real home commitments to keep them home. (5) Travel.

C. Counseling on the overall pros and cons of service life.

D. Yes.

E. Strong points--The program is set up to be more than just a shipping over talk. It provides information on the overall benefits of the service. Weak points--The men think that the program is just a shipping over program and the LCCO is a salesman. The program is undermanned. What is needed is a separate billet for this job only. It would reduce the work load on other petty officers. Perhaps a separate division with only this responsibility would be advisable.

Interview 0-9. (Rank of Commander; Chief Staff Officer of an Amphibious Squadron staff; previous experience in Amphibious Force.)

A. The product is not presented. The Navy doesn't sell itself. The men are not informed. Pay and those things are not the real reasons why men leave the service. We fail. Men leave the Navy by default.

B. (1) Some men like the comradeship of the Navy. (2) They are

convinced because they are informed. (3) The hard sell program ships over some men.

C. The program presents the Navy's side of the question of a Navy career versus a civilian career.

D. No comment.

E. Strong points--As conceived, it is an excellent program. Weak points--If it does not have command backing it can't function. It can't be done on a part-time basis.

F. The program needs to have full time billets designated.

Interview 0-10. (Rank of Captain; a senior staff officer on the Commander Amphibious Force Staff; over 20 years of naval experience; U.S. Naval Academy graduate; previous experience in Amphibious Force.)

A. (1) Lack of habitability on old ships. (2) Operating schdeules. (3) The Officer Candidate School officer serving as a division officer is not orientated toward a naval career. He is not the best salesman if he's not career motivated. The enlisted man knows this.

B. (1) For special programs such as STAR and SCORE. (2) The Variable Re-enlistment Bonus. This is especially true for the Third Class Petty Officer.

C. The program gives overall counseling with emphasis on re-enlisting.

D. The program is doing the most that can be done within the resources available.

E. Strong Points--It is a high ideal program. It's success revolves around the commanding officer. If a program gets command support it gets results. Weak points--The Bureau (of Naval Personnel) established these career leadership billets and ordered people into them. These people are good but some officers don't seem to be too impressive. Most are former

enlisted men. The pattern seems to call for this. While they may be devoted they are not necessarily salesmen.

Interview 0-11. (Rank of Rear Admiral; Commander of Amphibious Group Two.)

A. It depends on the man. (1) For the married man, family separation is the prime reason. Also, the wife's displeasure with Navy life. Finding a home and living on the sailor's pay make a decent life questionable. (2) For other men there are varied reasons. Some just don't like the Navy, some don't fit in, others leave to further or continue their education. Some are curious as to what they can do outside of the Navy. There are many personal reasons. It depends on the man.

B. Like before it depends on the man and what he is looking for.

C. The program can point out a future in the Navy. It can point out long range goals, those past the second enlistment. Understanding and seeing goals can lead to a better married life for the man. The program can serve as an education program for the man and his family.

D. The program is a good one. While it may seem difficult because of its massiveness and its mass audience it can also be tailored to the individual. A good program finds the individuals personal interests and is tailored to the individuals needs. It is not dependent on the shotgun method.

E. Strong and weak points--The success or failure depends on the team. The program is strong or weak depending on the strength or weakness of the team.

Interview 0-12. (Rank of Commander; Executive Officer of a landing ship dock (LSD); a Naval Academy graduate; a naval aviator.)

A. Men are seeking a means to success. They have a basic

inexperience with success. If they can't find success in the Navy, they leave.

B. They are successful. They see potential for greater success in the Navy.

C. Re-enlistment of quality personnel.

D. No comment.

E. Strong points--It is a positive leadership program. It uses basic psychology. It forces men into success through leadership. Good division officers and petty officers show others how to succeed as quickly as possible. Weak points--There is not enough time. The turnover of experienced men hurts the program too.

Interview O-13. (Rank of Lieutenant Commander; the Operations Officer and Acting Executive Officer of an Attack Cargo Ship (AKA); previous enlisted experience; previous Amphibious Force experience; over 20 years of naval service.)

A. Overcommitment of ships. The away time is excessive. The flexible operational schedule is such that men can't make plans.

B. (1) Men realize their limitations and the competition outside. (2) They realize how far they can go in the Navy. (3) Educational opportunities.

C. Retention.

D. No comment.

E. Strong points--The counselors are enlisted men. They bring a full picture of Navy benefits to the men on an equal footing. Weak points--The Variable Re-enlistment Bonus is buying some men but causing discontent in the non-receivers. It, like pro-pay, is not equitable and plays rate against rate. Stressing these advantages in the program only tend to disenchant non-eligible men.

Interview 0-14. (Rate of Chief Petty Officer; staff member of Commander Amphibious Force; serving as the Chief Petty Officer in the Force Leadership Development/Enlisted Retention Office; a petty officer with broad career counseling experience and instruction duty; an authority on career benefits.)

A. Strong leadership makes strong followers. If there is command interest in the man he will be loyal to the command. Leadership is the key to re-enlistment problems.

B. Leadership is the key. Part of leadership is a career information program. If there is a command interest, support and leadership men will develop loyalty. Re-enlistment is a natural result of strong leadership.

C. Provide career information and re-enlistment of qualified men.

D. It is an ever-developing program. Where it has command support it is serving the needs of the men.

E. Strong and weak points--Again the program is stronger or weaker depending on command support.

Interview 0-15. (Rank of Captain; an Amphibious Squadron Commander; U.S. Naval Academy graduate; previous experience in the Amphibious Force; over 20 years of service.)

A. There are many reasons but basically the Navy loses men because of "lack of decision" discharges. The Navy loses many qualified men because of two kinds of decision failures: (1) Some men sit tight, never make a decision and accept their discharge. (2) Other men make a decision only about what they are going to do after they get out. They are deciding about civilian alternatives. They don't decide about

Navy alternatives often because they have never been fully presented to them on a comparative basis.

B. Some make the decision. There are many reasons such as prestige, pride, opportunity to exercise authority, the uniform.

C. Re-enlisting high caliber men.

D. No comment.

E. Strong points--The personal interview is perhaps the most effective to bring out the tremendous number of concrete benefits a Navy career offers. Weak points--May be too grandiose and a paper exercise. May stress too much "what is in it for me rather than what I can do."

Interview 0-16. (Rank of Commander; Chief Staff Officer of an Amphibious Squadron; over 20 years naval experience; previous experience in Amphibious Force.)

A. Failure of the man to make the decision not to get out. He lets the Navy make the decision for him. Since the man makes no decision the Navy hands him his discharge.

B. They understand and want the benefits of a Navy career. They make the decision.

C. Re-enlist qualified enlisted personnel.

D. It is a good move. It is a beginning.

E. Strong points--It brings problems out in the open for the man. It gives him an opportunity to talk and to be talked to. Weak points--There has to be enough time available to make it work. Sometimes there isn't enough time.

Interview 0-17. (Rank of Lieutenant Commander; Director of Career Information course section of the Naval Amphibious Schools; over 20 years naval experience; previous enlisted service; previous naval school experience.)

A. (1) Pay. (2) Operating schedules. (3) Low morale because of frequent changes in policy. (4) They can make more money outside the Navy.

B. (1) Good experiences in the Navy. (2) Travel. (3) Well organized ships make it an enjoyable life. (4) Promotions. (5) Some men can't make a change for fear of losing security.

C. To train counselors and to re-enlist sailors.

D. No comment.

E. Strong points--A well organized program can show a man a clear career path. It can help him make the right decision for himself. Weak points--There is much apathy about the program. Command support is often missing. There is too much talk on paper and not enough clear talk to the men. Many program members just aren't interested.

Interview 0-18. (Rank of Captain; Commanding Officer of the Naval Amphibious School; U.S. Naval Academy graduate; former Amphibious Squadron Commander; broad background in naval personnel studies.)

A. (1) The Command doesn't reach down the line to the enlisted man. There is a lack of leadership in Commanding Officers and Executive Officers. This is reflected in junior officers and demonstrated by their lack of training. The command does not take the initiative. He takes short approach. When his program fails he blames it on the staff. (2) Operating schedules also have an effect.

B. (1) Strong leadership. (2) Dependable operating schedules.

C. Not asked by interviewer. Lack of time.

D. Not asked by interviewer. Lack of time.

E. The strong and weak points are dependent upon command leadership. If there is command interest there is a strong program. If there is no command interest there is not a program.

Interview 0-19. (Rank of Lieutenant; the Amphibious Force Leadership Career Counseling Officer; serving on the staff of Commander Amphibious Force as the Force Leadership Development/Enlisted Retention Officer; previous enlisted experience; previous Amphibious Force experience; over 20 years naval service.)

A. (1) Individuals feel their freedom is restricted but don't realize military justification for it. (2) They are not informed what to expect in the Navy or in a military organization. They often don't like what they find. Often the reasons for certain military procedures are not explained to them. (3) Lack of leadership. Too much concentration on technical aspects and not enough on other duties and interests. (4) Some men are just serving their military obligation. Upon completion they want to go home. Many want to work in their hometown. (5) Others go back to school.

B. (1) Security of a military service life and its retirement benefits. (2) Some men have no choice. They cannot afford to look for other employment. Family financial necessities make it nearly impossible to take any extended time to seek other employment. (3) Some men enjoy a Navy career.

C. To explain career benefits to all men in the Amphibious Force. To aid in retaining qualified enlisted personnel in the Navy.

D. & E. The interviewee did not wish to comment on these questions because he was new to the program and felt more experience in the program was required to provide valid responses.

Interview 0-20. (Rate of First Class Petty Officer (Radioman); an Enlisted Career Counseling Petty Officer aboard a tank landing ship (LST); over 12 years naval service; a career counseling school graduate; a leading petty officer aboard ship.)

A. (1) Deployments. Too much time away from family. (2) Long working hours. (3) Too much petty stuff.

B. (1) Variable re-enlistment bonus. (2) Choice of next duty assignment.

C. Re-enlistment.

D. It depends on the man. Men have different needs. If a man is suited for a Navy career then the program helps him decide and serves him.

E. Strong points--It makes information available to the man. It tells him what he is eligible for. Weak points--Sees no real weak points.

Interview 0-21. (Rate of First Class Petty Officer (Radioman); an enlisted Career Counseling Petty Officer aboard an attack cargo ship (AKA); over 10 years naval experience; a career counseling school graduate; a leading petty officer aboard ship; primary career counselor aboard ship; well informed and well organized career counselor in the opinion of the investigator.)

A. (1) Petty reasons. This includes such things as mad scrambles to get ship ready for senior officer visits, officer and senior petty officers inconsideration for men, forced charity donations, day to day "Mickey Mouse" aboard ship. (2) Habitability. (3) Mass punishment such as restriction of a whole division. (4) Navy doesn't live up to its commitments. Man expects leadership and discipline. It applies child like discipline without leadership.

B. (1) Money--Both the Variable Re-enlistment Bonus and regular payday.

C. Retain qualified men in the Navy.

D. It is a good program. It is a step in the right direction.

E. Strong points--(1) An enlisted man talks with another enlisted man about the Navy favorably. (2) The man has someone to turn to with his questions. (3) The Career counselor serves as a good go-between between division officers, petty officers and the man. (4) It is the "Big Brother" technique. Weak points--The career counselor is not equipped to handle difficult interviews. He is trained to give the pat interview and answer standard questions. Counselor really needs some psychology background.

Interview 0-22. (Rank of Lieutenant; instructor for the "Enlisted Personnel Administration and Counseling Course (officers)"; previous personnel and administrative experience; previous instructor experience; previous enlisted service experience.)

A. (1) BUPERS says its due to pay and family separations. (2) Decline of career attractiveness primarily because man can't identify with the Navy. It is an impersonal relationship. (3) Outside career attractiveness, especially in pay. (4) Decline of Navy retirement selling point. (5) Living conditions aboard ships are barely acceptable. On older ships they are unsatisfactory. (6) Career personnel, especially career petty officers talk down the Navy. They do not support their chosen profession before the younger enlisted man. (7) Many men do not receive the information necessary to make a career decision. (8) Phiblant does not sell Phiblant. There is no spirit. Men are unaware of Phiblant's mission. They see themselves serving in unglamorous ships on unglamorous duty.

B. Some men suited to the life. They don't make the decision not to get out.

C. Re-enlistment.

D. Not that familiar with program.

E. Strong points--They have taken the step to try to do something about the re-enlistment problem. Weak points--The program may take over some division officer responsibilities. This is not necessarily bad in some cases.

Interview 0-23. (Rank of Lieutenant; instructor for the "Enlisted Personnel Administration and Counseling Course (officers); previous instructor duty.)

A. (1) Due to a variety of conditions under which men serve. This runs from habitability to leadership problems. (2) Lack of communication. Many men don't understand why they are in the Navy, why their job is important, what benefits they have and what the Navy can offer. (3) Division officer guidance has declined. (4) Development of a negative attitude, often influenced by senior career petty officers.

B. The reverse of the above and the Variable Re-enlistment Bonus.

C. Re-enlistment.

D. Not that familiar with the program.

E. Not that familiar with the program.

Evaluation by Amphibious Force Enlisted Personnel

Interviews with enlisted members of the Amphibious Force were conducted in a manner similar to the command, policy makers and administrative personnel interviews. After interviewing the concerned officers aboard a ship the investigator requested permission of the commanding officer to interview members of the crew. In all instances permission was granted. The usual method of interviewee selection was for the investigator to review the enlisted personnel records in the ship's personnel office to determine suitable interviewees. The investigator attempted to select first term personnel with over one year of service.

The LCCO and personnel officer assisted in the file survey and selections only so far as determining which men were eligible for interviews. Following selection, the LCCO or personnel officer had the men notified and requested that they appear at the select interview area. No interviews were compulsory. All interviews were conducted privately and in a polite and formal manner. The investigator was dressed in civilian clothes and introduced himself as a graduate student at Boston University doing thesis research on retention questions in the Navy. The interviewee was asked his age, rate, and marital status. His name was not required. As stated previously men with over one year of service on their first enlistment were sought and made up the majority of the population. After brief introductory exchanges interviews were conducted. Enlisted personnel interviews are recorded as Interview E-1, E-2, etc. A brief description of the interviewee, noting his rate, age and marital status, preceeds the recording of his replies. Replies required some paraphrasing as previously recorded in the officer interview section of this study. Answers to interview questions are recorded as A., B., C., D., E., F., (G). Briefly restated these are answers to the following questions:

- A. WHY ARE SOME MEN LEAVING THE NAVY?
- B. WHY ARE SOME MEN RE-ENLISTING?
- C. HAS ANYTHING BEEN SAID TO YOU ABOARD SHIP REGARDING A NAVY CAREER?
- D. WHAT SEEMS TO BE THE MAIN ADVANTAGE AND DISADVANTAGE OF RE-ENLISTING?
- E. IF YOU WERE PLANNING ON GETTING OUT OF THE NAVY, WHAT COULD THE NAVY DO TO HAVE YOU CONSIDER RE-ENLISTING?
- F. WHAT DO YOU FEEL THE NAVY HAS DONE FOR YOU AND WHERE DO YOU THINK IT'S LETTING YOU DOWN?

G. ANY OTHER COMMENTS.

Interview E-1. ETN 3 (Electronics Technician Communications Third Class), age 22, single.

A. (1) Poor rotation policy. (2) Family separations. (3) More pay outside.

B. Nothing on the outside for them. They feel they don't have anything to go to so they stay in the Navy.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--The Variable Re-enlistment Bonus. Disadvantage--More poor rotation ahead.

E. Transfer to other duty. I have been aboard this ship for 45 months.

F. Done: Sent me to schools, educated me. Let down: They won't rotate me.

Interview E-2: SN (Seaman), age 20, single.

A. (1) Too much "Mickey Mouse" stuff. Too many "big sweats."
(2) Abused by officers and petty officers. (3) Low pay.

B. (1) Some men just like the Navy. (2) Petty officers have authority and they like it. They stay in because they do.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--None. Disadvantage--Family separations if you go to sea.

E. Nothing.

F. Done: Nothing. Let down: The Navy is not what I expected. The Gators (Amphibious Force) are dull. May be different in other parts of Navy.

Interview E-3. SF 3 (Shipfitter Third Class), age 23, married.

A. (1) Petty stuff everyday. There are too many bosses. There is too much contradiction. (2) Family separation. Six months is too long to be away from your family.

B. Don't know.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--Retirement benefits. Disadvantage--Time away from home.

E. Don't know.

F. Done: Taught me a trade. Let down: No.

Interview E-4. HM 3 (Hospital Corpsman Third Class), age 20, single.

A. (1) Regimentation. (2) Can't pick time and place to do your job. It is forced labor. (3) Home life is disrupted by ship schedules. (4) Some men get out to go back to school.

B. Schools in the Navy.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage: Schools. Disadvantage--Family separation.

E. Guarantee of going to male nursing school.

F. Done: Helped me mature. Let down: Haven't given me the school that I want and need.

Interview E-5. FN (Fireman), age 20, single.

A. (1) Pay. (2) There is a lot of little stuff you have to put up with everyday.

B. (1) Men in debt need the bonus money to pay off debts. (2) Some guys know they can't make it on the outside.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--Commissary benefits. Disadvantage--Away from home too much.

E. Nothing could make me re-enlist.

F. Done: Educated me. Let down: No.

Interview E-6. DC 3 (Damage Controlman Third Class), age 22, single.

A. (1) Too much sea duty.

B. (2) Navy benefits such as retirement and exchange privileges.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--Guaranteed schools. Disadvantage--None really.

E. No comment.

F. Done: Nothing. Let down: It is too hard to change my rate.

I haven't received much help trying to change my rate.

Interview E-7. SFP 2 (Shipfitter Pipefitter Second Class), age 21, single.

A. (1) Not enough rotation. Tours are too long on same ship.

(2) You can't change rates.

B. (1) Variable Re-enlistment Bonus. (2) Schools.

C. No.

D. Advantage--If you like the life it's the easy way to keep it.

Disadvantage: None.

E. Nothing.

F. Done: The Navy has given me excellent training in a trade and an opportunity to use it. Let down: No.

Interview E-8. IC 3 (Interior Communications Electrician Third Class), age 19, single.

A. (1) Outside advantages of pay and freedom. (2) Family separations for the married man.

B. (1) Security. They feel they can't make it on the outside.
(2) Some men like the Navy.

C. Yes.

- D. Advantage--Schools. Disadvantage: Enlistment is too long.
- E. Selection for NESEP or a good school guarantee.
- F. Done: Education. Navy is a good place to spend your service commitment. Let down: No.

Interview E-9. DK 3 (Disbursing Clerk Third Class), age 24, married.

- A. (1) Poor advancement in non-critical rates. (2) Better pay with more opportunities for advancement outside.
- B. Variable Re-enlistment Bonus.
- C. Yes.
- D. Advantage--Variable Re-enlistment Bonus. Disadvantage--The Navy doesn't always keep its word, such as on choice of duty option re-enlistments.
- E. Nothing.
- F. Done: Given me good experience for business. Let down: No rotation.

Interview E-10. BM 2 (Boatswain's Mate Second Class), age 32, married.

- A. (1) Not enough backing from above. Petty officers often are not supported by seniors. (2) Variable Re-enlistment bonus is not available to all deck force seaman. The deck force seaman doesn't benefit at all from it. (3) There's too much politics aboard ship and in the Navy. There is too much inside maneuvering.
- B. Don't know.
- C. Yes.
- D. Advantage--Retirement benefits. Disadvantage--You don't know what to expect. Too many changes in the Navy.
- E. Better living conditions on ships.

F. Done: Training. Let down: No.

Interview E-11. ETR 3 (Electronics Technician Radar Third Class),
age 26, married.

A. (1) Small stuff aboard ship. (2) Pay better on outside.

B. (1) Travel. (2) Some men don't have a future outside.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--Variable Re-enlistment Bonus. Disadvantage--Forces
more years of dislocation.

E. Nothing.

F. Done: Technical training, school education, helped me mature.

Let down: No.

Interview E-12. SA (Seaman Apprentice), age 19, single.

A. (1) Too difficult to advance in rating. (2) Low pay.

B. Some men like the Navy way of life.

C. No.

D. Advantage--The Navy is a lazy mans life. There is no challenge
to it. It's secure. Disadvantage--You can't have any family life because
of frequent separations.

E. There is nothing that can be offered to compensate for loss of
home life.

F. Done: The Navy has given me some sense of responsibility. Let
down: No.

Interview E-13. YN 3 (Yeoman Third Class), age 22, single.

A. (1) Pay. (2) Poor rotation makes for too much sea duty.

B. Security.

C. Yes.

D. Advantages--Security. Disadvantage--Away from home too much.

E. Nothing.

F. Done: Helped mature me by giving me a sense of responsibility and taught me discipline. Let down: No.

Interview E-14. SA (Seaman Apprentice), age 20, single.

A. (1) Family separations. (2) Military life is nerve-racking. (3) Officers and petty officers pull rank on non-rated man. There is too much brass.

B. (1) Advanced training in your specialty. (2) Travel.

C. No.

D. Advantage--Bonus. Disadvantage--Family separations.

E. Guaranteed shore duty and a choice of rate for career purposes.

F. Done: Satisfied with Navy. Let down: No.

Interview E-15. SN (Seaman), age 22, single.

A. (1) You can't make plans because of variable deployment schedules. You are never sure what you are going to be doing. (2) Poor living conditions aboard ship. (3) Everyday "Mickey Mouse" business aboard ship. All the little nonsense jobs get a man down. They hurt his pride.

B. (1) Security. Some men can't make a go of it on the outside. (2) Others make rate and see advancement which again offers security. A rated man with a family has a difficult choice.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--Total service benefits. Disadvantage--You can't make plans in the Navy because of frequent schedule changes.

E. Nothing.

F. Done: Helped me mature. I see things as they really are now. Let down: No.

Interview E-16. SN (Seaman), age 20, single.

A. (1) I don't want to live a life of being second best. The enlisted

man is second best. (2) Officers with little experience are telling experienced men what to do. (3) The Amphibs are not any good. They are no fun to be in.

B. (1) Security. (2) Bonus.

C. No.

D. Advantage--None. Disadvantage--You stay second best to everybody.

E. A commission.

F. Done: Navy has matured me. I would do it all over for the experience alone. Let down: No.

Interview E-17. BM 3 (Boatswain's Mate Third Class), age 21, married.

A. (1) Some people just don't like the Navy life. They want to be home with their family. (2) Just not enough pay for the amount of work.

B. (1) They are afraid they can't make it on the outside.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--Navy benefits. Disadvantage--More separations from family.

E. Nothing.

F. Done: Nothing. Let down: No.

Interview E-18. EN 3 (Engineman Third Class), age 22, single.

A. (1) Poor working conditions. Old ships, old equipment. (2) Living conditions. Berthing spaces are inadequate and unacceptable. (3) Family separations.

B. (1) Some men have never had it better. It is a good life for them. (2) Others are too lazy to get out of the Navy and really work. If they have an easy job in the Navy they stay in.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--Job security. Disadvantage--Your freedom is curtailed.

E. Nothing.

F. Done: Taught me a lot. The Navy has sent me to good schools.

Let down: My chance for advancement was lost because of administrative errors.

Interview E-19. SN (Seaman), age 19, married.

A. (1) Duty choices are limited. (2) Away from home too much.

(3) The Navy does things in a roundabout way. Everything is done the hard way. (4) Low pay.

B. (1) They like the Navy. (2) Travel.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--Security. Disadvantage--Restriction of personal freedom.

E. NESEP or Nuclear Power School appointment.

F. Done: Showed me that both the Navy and myself are worthwhile.

It has matured me. Let down: No.

Interview E-20. ET 3 (Electronics Technician Third Class), age 26, single.

A. (1) Men are expected to do a job without proper equipment. We have few tools. We are ridiculed if we can't perform miracles. We aren't supported. (2) We don't have a decent place to work or live. (3) We don't get understanding from above.

B. (1) They lack the guts to compete on the outside. They keep the Navy's job security.

C. Very little.

D. Advantage--Educational benefits. Disadvantage--Enlisting into a life of indecision and uncertainty.

E. Nothing.

F. Done: Helped me understand the hardships of a service career. Let down: Navy life is nothing like what the recruiters said. They put out propaganda.

Interview E-21. MM 2 (Machinist's Mate Second Class), age 27, married.

A. (1) It's like "monkey see, monkey do." Everyone gets out because the other guy is getting out. Negative attitudes develop and are discussed among the sailors. They only talk about the disadvantages. They talk themselves into getting out as a group. Even if they would like to stay in, they follow the crowd and get out. (2) Family demands. (3) Pay.

B. (1) Security. (2) They like their job.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--Bonus. Disadvantage--Second enlistment men don't get the big bonus that first enlistment men get.

E. Don't know.

F. Done: Sent me to a good school. Aided my education. Let down: No.

Interview E-22. RMSN (Radioman Seaman), age 21, single.

A. (1) Harrassment by petty officers all the time. (2) Takes too long to make a comfortable income (pay).

B. (1) Security. You always have a job. It's a lazy man't life. (2) Educational opportunities.

C. No.

D. Advantage--Bonus. Disadvantage--Freedom limited. You can't come and go as you want.

E. Would re-enlist if the Navy had a wage scale comparable to that of similar jobs in civilian life.

F. Done: (1) Disciplined me. (2) Helped me appreciate civilian life. Let down: (1) Poor officer leadership. (2) Poor organization. (3) Poor living conditions.

Interview E-23. SA (Seaman Apprentice), age 18, single.

A. (1) They don't like to take orders. (2) Pay. (3) Long working hours and difficult work.

B. (1) Petty officers life and pay is pretty good. (2) Security. (3) They have friends in the Navy and stay together. (4) Family pressures.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--Bonus. Disadvantage--More sea duty.

E. Better pay and an assured school.

F. Done: Matured me. Let down: The Navy life isn't like the recruiters story.

Interview E-24. CSSN (Commissaryman Seaman), age 20, single.

A. (1) Some men can't take military life. (2) Petty officers are too demanding.

B. Critical rates can get more training and advancements.

C. No.

D. Advantage--None. Disadvantage--Nothing changes.

E. Guarantee the school of your choice.

F. Done: Helped me mature. Let down: No.

Interview E-25. PNSN (Personnel Man Seaman), age 20, single.

A. (1) There are more advantages on the outside. If a man is sharp he has no business staying in the service. (2) The GI Bill offers more if you get out. It is an incentive to get out of service.

B. (1) Job security. They have to keep the job for family support. (2) It is an easy life for men who like to slide.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--No real advantage. Disadvantage--Lack of personal satisfaction in Navy.

E. Nothing.

F. Done: Strengthened my character. Let down: No.

Interview E-26. BM 3 (Boatswain's Mate Third Class), age 21, single.

A. (1) Benefits aren't good enough anymore. Civilians can match them. (2) They don't like their ship and assignment. (3) Promises are not kept by Navy or people aboard ship. (4) Living and working conditions are poor. (5) Some men are left out of the Variable Re-enlistment Bonus.

B. (1) Choice of duty guaranteed. (2) Variable Re-enlistment Bonus.

C. No.

D. Advantage--Bonus. Disadvantage--More sea duty.

E. (1) Guaranteed shore duty for half of the enlistment.
(2) Variable Re-enlistment Bonus opened to Boatswain Mates.

F. Done: Given me sense of responsibility. Let down: Navy doesn't live up to promises. After approving a change in duty it was canceled.

Interview E-27. SFPFN (Shipfitter Pipefitter Fireman), age 20, married.

A. (1) Petty stuff. Little things everyday. (2) Family separations.
(3) Poor living conditions aboard ship.

B. (1) Men who are in debt re-enlist to get the bonus money.
(2) Others don't have a trade for the outside. They stay in the Navy because they don't have to worry about finding a job.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--None. Disadvantage--There's not much to do when

you're not working. Also, after you finish a career at age 40 it is hard to get a job.

E. Nothing.

F. Done: Taught me a trade. Let down: (1) The Navy recruiter gave me incorrect information about schools. He said I'd go to school but I didn't. (2) I didn't get enough information about rates and different rate advantages when I came in the Navy.

Interview E-28. FN (Fireman), age 19, single.

A. (1) "Mickey Mouse" stuff. You are expected to work long hours and still put up with all the petty stuff that goes on. (2) Inexperienced officers don't understand the work problems. They don't understand the enlisted man's problems. (3) Bad living conditions aboard ship, especially small ships.

B. (1) Bonus. (2) Assignment to schools.

C. No.

D. Advantage--School. Disadvantage--Lack of freedom.

E. Nothing.

F. Done: Training. Let down: The Navy is not like its pictured to you before you go in.

Interview E-29. FTG 2 (Fire Control Technician Gun Fire Control Second Class), age 24, single.

A. (1) There are more civilian opportunities and advantages such as better pay, living conditions and freedom of movement. (2) "Mickey Mouse stuff." There is just too much concern over little things in the Navy. After awhile all the little stuff gets to be a big thing. Some sailors can put up with all the little stuff everyday but others are just counting the days till they can get out and get away from it.

B. (1) Security.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--Education. Disadvantage--Navy life oppresses freedom too much.

E. Selection for an officer program.

F. Done: The Navy has given me both a technical education and an education in human relations. Let down: I wanted to get into the Polaris program. I feel I was given adequate consideration.

Interview E-30. ETN 3 (Electronics Technician Communications Third Class), age 23, married.

A. Military standards are continually changing. Less experienced and less qualified officers and petty officers are demanding more and more. Lots of their demands are unnecessary. Their rank goes to their head.

B. (1) Career benefits such as schools, bonus, pro-pay, choice of duty, retirement.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--Variable Re-enlistment Bonus. Disadvantage--None.

E. Guaranteed shore duty.

F. Done: Given me an electronics education. The Navy has given me everything I've asked for. Let down: No.

Interview E-31. SA (Seaman Apprentice), age 19, single.

A. (1) Military restrictions are not acceptable. (2) Low pay.

B. (1) Some can't make it on the outside. (2) Some men enjoy the Navy life.

C. No.

D. Advantage--Variable Re-enlistment Bonus. Disadvantage--Lack of personal freedom in the service.

E. Nothing.

F. Done: It has kept me out of the Army. Let down: The Navy does not live up to the Recruiter's promises. The Navy is not like they say it is.

Interview E-32. SA (Seaman Apprentice), age 19, single.

A. (1) It's too rough of a life. Long hours and hard work.

(2) Family separations.

B. (1) Variable Re-enlistment Bonus. (2) Some men think it's a good life.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--Bonus. Disadvantage--Too much time away from home if you want to get married and have a family.

E. Nothing.

F. Done: Given me a good school. Let down: No.

Interview E-33. SA (Seaman Apprentice), age 20, single.

A. (1) Low pay. You can't support a family on it. (2) Military discipline.

B. (1) Benefits of a service career. (2) Some men can't make it on the outside.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--Bonus. Disadvantage--Too much time away from home. It is hard on family life.

E. Nothing.

F. Done: Helped me mature. Let down: No.

Interview E-34. SA (Seaman Apprentice), age 19, single.

A. (1) Too much "petty stuff." (2) Military regulations restrict freedom too much. (3) Too much sea time.

B. (1) Training is worth it for some. (2) Travel. (3) Others don't mind the "petty stuff" and like the Navy.

C. No.

D. Advantage--None. Disadvantage--More petty stuff to look forward to if you re-enlist.

E. Nothing.

F. Done: No comment. Let down: Petty officers go too far. Often they aren't correct yet they get backing. It isn't right.

Interview E-35. PN 3 (Personnel Man Third Class), age 20, single.

A. (1) Command policies are too restrictive, especially on liberty. (2) No variation in cruises. Keep going to same places. (3) The rules change from day to day aboard ship. There are always policy changes. You don't know what to expect.

B. (1) Security.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--None. Disadvantage--None.

E. Nothing.

F. Done: Helped me mature. Has shown me how other people live.

Let down: No.

Interview E-36. YN 3 (Yeoman Third Class), age 21, married.

A. They want to try another kind of life. Navy life in general is too restrictive.

B. To get assignment to good schools.

C. No.

D. Advantage--Variable Re-enlistment Bonus. Disadvantage--Even if you re-enlist under the choice of duty option plan you may not get what you want.

E. Nothing.

F. Done: Has helped educate me. Let down: No.

Interview E-37. QM 3 (Quartermaster Third Class), age 25, single.

A. (1) There is no leadership. Division officers and leading petty officers offer no leadership.

B. Job security and retirement benefits.

C. No.

D. Advantage--Travel. Disadvantage--None.

E. Assured choice of duty assignment.

F. Done: Furthered my education. It has trained me. Let down: There is no leadership. There is no one to turn to when you need help or advice.

Interview E-38. RM 3 (Radioman Third Class), age 22, married.

A. (1) Lack of personal freedom. (2) Family hardships. Military requirements come before family needs.

B. (1) Variable Re-enlistment Bonus. (2) Assignment to schools and guaranteed advancement.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--Bonus. Disadvantage--More family separations.

E. Nothing.

F. Done: Given me some good schools. Let down: Too much restriction of freedom.

Interview E-39. HM 3 (Hospital Corpsman Third Class), age 20, single.

A. (1) You can't make plans because of the changes in schedules. (2) Family separations. (3) The "don't care" attitude in each echelon of command. (4) Low pay.

B. (1) Most men are brainwashed by senior petty officers who can't do any better themselves and want company. (2) Some men re-enlist because they are patriotic.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--None. Disadvantage--Once you re-enlist the Navy forgets about you.

E. Get a college education program.

F. Done: Seeing other people in Navy has shown me the importance of getting a good education if you want to get ahead. Let down: The Navy is not as glamorous as advertised.

Interview E-40. BM 2 (Boatswain's Mate Second Class), age 20, single.

A. (1) There are many good civilian jobs to choose from if you get out. (2) Girlfriends and wives influence a decision to leave the Navy. They want the man at home more.

B. Benefits such as bonus, school programs and retirement benefits are part of a total package that is very attractive.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--Bonus. Disadvantage--Too much sea time.

E. The Navy needs new incentives and approaches. I don't know what they are.

F. Done: It has given me responsibility, supervisory experience, training and a useful skill. Let down: No.

Interview E-41. SN (Seaman), age 20, single.

A. (1) Too many deployments. (2) There is no good reason for staying in the Amphibs.

B. They get their choice of overseas shore duty if they re-enlist. It is a good deal for a single man.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--General Navy benefits. Disadvantage--More long deployments.

E. I would re-enlist for a guaranteed three year overseas shore duty tour in Sweden.

F. Done: Given me experience in living. Let down: Military discipline is not administered the same to everyone. Some are privileged. Navy life is not what it's cracked-up to be.

Interview E-42. RD 3 (Radarman Third Class), age 20, married.

A. (1) Civilian life does not restrict freedom like military life does. (2) Officers are always telling enlisted men what to do. Many of them, especially the reserve officers, are not necessarily competent. It is hard to take orders everyday from someone you don't respect. (3) Low pay.

B. (1) Total Navy benefits. (2) Some men are afraid they can't get a job on the outside so they stay in. (3) If you are an E-5 or above it has advantages which tempt you to stay in.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--Comradeship of friends in the Navy. Disadvantage--You loose contact with the civilian world. You miss things going on at home.

E. Give a man his choice of duty for his entire enlistment period. That is, give him a general catagory choice of jobs in a general area.

F. Done: Given me an education. Let down: No.

Interview E-43. SA (Seaman Apprentice), age 19, single.

A. (1) To return to school. (2) They have a job waiting for them at home. (3) They want to get married and be at home.

B. (1) Travel. (2) Their job in the Navy didn't prepare them for a job outside, so they stay in the Navy.

C. No.

D. Advantage--Don't know. Disadvantage--Don't know.

E. Don't know.

F. Done: It has given me some responsibility. It has helped me grow up. Let down: No.

Interview E-44. SN (Seaman), age 19, single.

A. (1) There are better job prospects outside the Navy.

B. (1) Travel. (2) It's an easy life. (3) Security and benefits.

C. No.

D. Advantage--It provides a sure paycheck (security). Disadvantage--No comment.

E. Nothing.

F. Done: Nothing. Let down: The Navy hasn't given me any responsibilities.

Interview E-45. SN (Seaman), age 19, single.

A. (1) Most men never intended to stay in. They are just serving their military obligation. (2) There are a lot of inconveniences. It especially messes-up family life. There is too much moving around.

B. (1) It gives men responsibility. They enjoy it. (2) Some men are afraid to start a new way of life. (3) Navy benefits, especially retirement benefits.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--Security. Disadvantage--Can't fulfill educational ambitions if you are moving around in the Navy.

E. Send me to school under the NESEP program.

F. Done: Given me some sense of responsibility. Let down: School promises haven't been fulfilled as yet.

Interview E-46. SA (Seaman Apprentice), age 18, single.

A. (1) Military restrictions limit your freedom of movement. Out-

side the Navy you are free to do what you want.

B. (1) Bonus. (2) To make a rate. (3) Travel.

C. No.

D. Advantage--Bonus. Disadvantage--Enlistments are too long.

E. I would want one week of liberty per month to consider re-enlisting.

F. Done: It has taught me to take care of myself. Let down: No.

Interview E-47. FTGSN (Fire Control Technician Gun Fire Control Seaman), age 21, single.

A. (1) Better pay outside of the Navy. (2) Too much time away from home. (3) Technical skill opportunities are wide open outside. (4) The Navy way of doing things is seldom the easiest way.

B. (1) Some men can't make it on the outside. (2) Some men like their work and the Navy. (3) Family responsibilities make it impossible to get out.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--Variable Re-enlistment Bonus. Disadvantage--Family separations.

E. Nothing.

F. Done: The Navy has given me good training in electronics. Let down: Friction with petty officers has hindered my advancement to rate.

Interview E-48. SN (Seaman), age 18, single.

A. (1) Some men want to go back to school. (2) Some men can't adjust to the rigors of military life.

B. (1) Security. (2) Bonus.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--Advancement in rate possible. Disadvantage--Lack of personal freedom hurts family life. You or your family never know where you're going to be the next day.

E. Nothing.

F. Done: The Navy is going to give me electronics training.

Let down: No.

Interview E-49. FN (Fireman), age 21, married.

A. (1) Some men can't take the responsibility that is thrust on them so they get out. (2) There are better job opportunities on the outside.

B. (1) Security. (2) Variable Re-enlistment Bonus.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--You can get a choice of schools. Disadvantage--You will still be away from home a lot.

E. Reduce school qualifications.

F. Done: Helped me grow up. Let down: No.

Interview E-50. RD 3 (Radarman Third Class), age 20, married.

A. (1) Family separations. (2) Living conditions aboard ship. Most berthing compartments amount to having 35 men in one hot bedroom.

B. (1) Travel. (2) There is good companionship in the Navy that is worth keeping.

C. Yes.

D. Advantage--NESEP if you can get it. Disadvantage--You will be away from home often.

E. (1) Separation pay when away from home. (2) A guaranteed shore billet or schooling under NESEP.

F. Done: It has let me travel and sent me to schools. Let down: No.

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW RESPONSES FROM ENLISTED PERSONNEL

A summary of the replies made to the interview questions by the enlisted interviewees is reported in the tables and comments which follow.

TABLE 1
REASONS WHY ENLISTED MEN LEAVE THE NAVY

Reason	Frequency as first reply	Frequency as secondary reply	Total
Pay	9	15	24
Petty Stuff	6	8	14
Military Restrictions	13	5	18
Return to School/Job	2	2	4
Poor Rotation	3	4	7
Family Separations/Long Deployment	5	16	21
Poor Advancement	2	1	3
Poor Leadership/Lack of Support	6	8	14
Poor Working/Living Conditions	1	8	9
Changing or Unfair Policy	0	4	4
Changing Schedules	1	0	1
Don't Like Amphibs	0	2	2
Other	2	1	3
Total	50	74	124

TABLE 2
REASON GIVEN FOR MEN RE-ENLISTING

Reason	Frequency as first reply	Frequency as secondary reply	Total
Overall Career Benefits/ Security (Including Retirement)	13	6	19
Job Security (Unable to Succeed Outside)	10	12	22
Variable Re-enlistment Bonus	8	4	12
Like Navy Life/Job	5	8	13
To Get Schools	5	4	9
Travel	4	4	8
Choice of Duty Options	2	0	2
Talked into Re-enlistment	1	1	2
Don't Know	2	0	2
Other	0	1	1
Total	50	40	90

Thirty five interviewees acknowledged that information concerning a Navy career had been presented to them. This figure represents 70% of the total interviewees. $35:50 = 70\%$.

TABLE 3

REASON GIVEN AS PRIMARY ADVANTAGE OF RE-ENLISTING

Advantage	Frequency
Bonus	17
Security (Overall Benefits).	10
Get Schools	8
Job Security	3
Like Navy Life	2
Travel	1
None/Don't Know	9
Total	50

TABLE 4

REASON GIVEN AS PRIMARY DISADVANTAGE OF RE-ENLISTING

Disadvantage	Frequency
Family Separations	17
Military Restrictions	8
Policy Changes/Navy Doesnt Keep Promises	6
More Sea Duty	4
Don't Like Navy	3
Enlistments too Long	2
More Petty Stuff	1
Low Pay	1
No Challenge Career	1
Miss School Opportunity	1
No Job Future at Navy Retirement	1
None/Don't Know	5
Total	50

Table 5 reports the responses to the personal question of "What could the Navy do to have you consider re-enlisting?" Twenty-four men indicated that nothing could induce them to consider re-enlisting. Five didn't know or made no comment. Twenty-one men indicated that they would consider re-enlisting if certain requirements were met. This represents 42% of the population which would consider re-enlisting if certain requirements were met.

TABLE 5

REPLIES GIVEN TO QUESTION "WHAT COULD NAVY DO
TO HAVE YOU CONSIDER RE-ENLISTING?"

Reply	Frequency
Nothing could be done	24
No comment/don't know	5
Guarantee school	7
Guarantee shore tour	5
Guarantee rotation/duty choice	3
Better pay	3
Acceptance into college program	3
Commission opportunity	2
Better living/working conditions	1
Give rate change	1
Offer variable re-enlistment bonus to rate (not eligible now)	1
Better liberty policy	1
Total	56*

*Some individuals gave more than one requirement.

The final question asked the enlisted interviewee concerned whether he felt the Navy had helped him in any way and whether the Navy had let him down in some way. Forty-three individuals felt the Navy had helped them and twenty-two felt the Navy had let them down in some way. Some interviewees answered affirmatively to both questions. In terms of percentages 86% of the interviewees felt that the Navy had helped them in some way while 44% felt that the Navy had let them down in some manner.

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW RESPONSES FROM COMMAND POLICY MAKING AND ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL

A summary of the replies made to the interview questions by the command, policymaking and administrative personnel is reported in the tables and comments which follow.

TABLE 6
REASONS WHY ENLISTED MEN LEAVE THE NAVY

Reason	Frequency as first reply	Frequency as secondary reply	Total
Family Separations/Long Deployments	4	4	8
Navy Doesn't Sell Itself	3	7	10
Military Restrictions	3	4	7
Pay	2	2	4
Petty Stuff	2	1	3
Return to School/Job	2	3	5
Poor Leadership/Support	2	6	8
Poor Advancement	1	1	2
Poor living/Working Conditions	1	4	5

TABLE 6--Continued

Reason	Frequency as first reply	Frequency as secondary reply	Total
Changing Policy	1	1	2
Amphibious Force Not Attractive	1	2	3
Combination of Reasons	1	1	2
Total	23	36	59

TABLE 7

REASONS WHY MEN RE-ENLIST

Reason	Frequency as first reply	Frequency as secondary reply	Total
Like Navy Life/Job	10	6	16
Bonus	4	2	6
Security (Overall Career Benefits)	2	2	4
Job Security (Unable to succeed Outside)	2	5	7
Talked into Re-enlisting by Friends	2		2
Leadership	2	2	4
To Get Schools/Training	1	2	3
Financial Necessity		1	1
Duty Option Incentive		1	1
Travel		2	2
Total	23	23	46

The command, policymaking and administrative personnel interviewees were asked what was the primary goal of the LCCO program. Sixteen interviewees replied that the goal was "re-enlistment." Six replied that the goal was to provide an overall career counseling program. One interviewee did not comment on the question. These figures indicate that 70% of the population considers re-enlistment as the primary goal of the LCCO program and 26% consider overall career counseling as the primary goal.

The interviewees were then asked whether they felt that the LCCO program served the needs of the sailor. Thirteen interviewees felt that the program served the needs of the sailor while 9 interviewees made no comment or indicated that they didn't know. One interviewee was not asked the question because of time limitations. There were no negative replies.

The final question asked the interviewees what were the strong points and weak points of the program. Tables 8 and 9 report the replies.

TABLE 8
STRONG POINTS OF LCCO PROGRAM

Reply	Frequency
Provides Career Information to the Sailor	10
Lets Man Talk on Equal Footing with Counselor. Personal Interview Method Good	6
Program Depends on Command Support and Leadership. If it's Strong, Program is Strong	4
No Comment/Answer Not Connected	3
Total.	23

TABLE 9
WEAK POINTS OF LCCO PROGRAM

Reply	Frequency
Not enough time for program. Work load and mission take precedence.	7
Program depends on command support and leadership. If it's weak, program is weak	6
Too much reliance on program. By-passes division officer.	2
Unqualified counselors	2
A mandatory program	1
Program is too big/too much paperwork	1
No weak points	1
No comment/answer not connected	3
Total	23

Testing of Enlisted Interviewees

Following each interview with an enlisted man he was asked to complete a brief multiple choice/true or false question type test. The test was designed to test the individual's knowledge of some basic Navy programs, incentives and benefits. It consisted of 6 multiple choice questions and 6 true or false questions. All of the questions concerned material presented through the LCCO program. Each man was asked to complete the test to the best of his ability. He was not required to place his name on the test. This was done in hopes of placing the man at ease and without fears of later embarrassment because of a possible low score. He was asked to fill in spaces which indicated his age, rate and marital status. This information was requested to compile characteristics of the sample. He was asked to complete the test at a

desk or table a short distance away from the interviewer. This gave the individual a degree of privacy while still insuring the integrity of the test procedure.

For the purpose of continuity and because the test was on elongated paper a copy of the test is now made part of the text of this study. The correct answer to each question is marked. (While answer b. is the preferred correct answer to question 1, answer a. was also allowed.)

Age _____

Rate _____

Married _____

Single _____

-
1. Which of the following is a benefit of the STAR Program?
 - ☒ a. Guaranteed transfer to shore duty.
 - ☒ b. Guaranteed assignment to Class A or B school, as appropriate.
 - c. Transfer to Critical Rate training.
 - d. Assignment to the U.S. Naval Academy Prep School.
 2. Which of the following is a benefit of the NESEP Program?
 - ☒ a. Provides a 4 year college education with full pay.
 - b. Provides a 3 year nuclear power training course with full pay.
 - c. Provides an education and commission through the U.S. Naval Academy.
 - d. Provides flight training with full pay.
 3. The SCORE Program is primarily concerned with which of the following programs?
 - a. Electronic Specialty training program.
 - b. In-service athletic training and fitness program.
 - c. Tuition aid program.
 - ☒ d. Change of rating program.
 4. The Dependency Indemnity Compensation provides monthly payments to the widow of a serviceman, who dies on active duty, at which of the following rates?
 - a. \$100.00 plus 10% of basic pay.
 - ☒ b. \$120.00 plus 12% of basic pay.
 - c. \$100.00 plus any special or incentive pay.
 - d. 1/2 of the serviceman's basic pay.
 5. The Death Gratuity Payment to survivors of a serviceman, who dies on active duty, is which of the following sums?
 - a. \$600.00
 - b. 3 months basic pay plus any special or incentive pay.
 - ☒ c. 6 months basic pay plus any special or incentive pay.
 - d. \$750.00 plus one year's total of any special or incentive pay.

6. The Variable Re-enlistment Bonus, which can provide up to four times the regular bonus, is based on which item?

- x a. Skill
- b. Age
- c. Constructive time
- d. Marital status

7. First term personnel who re-enlist under the "Duty Assignment Option Program" are provided these choices. (True or false)

- Tx F a. Transfer within the same Fleet with home port or specific ship or unit guaranteed.
- Tx F b. Transfer to another Fleet with home port or specific ship or unit guaranteed.
- Tx F c. Transfer to a new construction ship with type guaranteed.
- Tx F d. Transfer to overseas shore duty with area guaranteed.
- Tx F e. Transfer to U.S. shore duty in the Naval District desired, if eligible for SEAVEY.
- Tx F f. Retention aboard same ship for a specified number of months.

TABLE 10

SUMMARY OF CORRECT TEST REPLIES

Number of Questions Answered Correctly	Number of Individuals Answering Correctly
12	0
11	1
10	4
9	5
8	8
7	8
6	7
5	9
4	5
3	2
2	0
1	0
0	1
Total	50

TABLE 11

SUMMARY OF CORRECT REPLIES TO SPECIFIC TEST QUESTIONS
AND PERCENTAGE OF SAMPLE ANSWERING CORRECTLY

Question Number	Correct Replies	Percentage Answering Correctly
1. STAR Program (Selective Training and Retention)	37	74%
2. NESEP (Navy Enlisted Scientific Education Program)	27	54%
3. SCORE Program (Selective Conversion and Retention)	25	50%
4. Dependency Compensation Benefit	5	10%
5. Death Gratuity Benefit	25	50%
6. Variable Re-enlistment Bonus	38	76%
7. to 12. Duty Assignment Option	173/300	58%

CHAPTER IV
SUMMARY OF THE PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEM
AND EVALUATION OF THE PUBLIC RELATIONS PROGRAM

Summary of the Public Relations Problem

The United States Navy, like many other large organizations, has personnel problems. One segment of the Navy, the U.S. Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force, has had a particularly serious problem in retaining qualified enlisted personnel. At the time this study was initiated the Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force had the lowest re-enlistment rate of first term enlisted personnel in the entire Navy. The Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force was faced with a serious public relations problem. It was primarily an internal public relations problem since it concerned problems with individuals within it's own organization. However, it could be considered a national public relations problem also because it involved the loss of personnel whose salaries are paid by the American public. Every American citizen who pays taxes is involved. An average of nearly \$14,000.00 is spent on training and paying for the services of the average Navy man during his enlistment. When one of these men decides to leave the Navy there is a sizeable loss plus the cost of training his replacement. Besides the economic outlay, the security of every American citizen is also affected because some of the Navy's most qualified men are leaving the service. Many of their places are being taken by less qualified individuals and in some instances they are not being filled at all. The resulting lowering of the experience level in the Navy cannot help but reduce the Navy's overall effectiveness and readiness. With more new and sophisticated ships joining the Fleet the need is for more experienced, specialized

and resourceful sailors. Yet, all the ships in the Navy are not new and sophisticated. Many, if not most of them, are old ships that are getting older. Many are showing their age. After years of continuous service and with increasing demands being placed on them they are showing the wear and tear of hard steaming. They are wearing down. Some are just about worn out. Only continual and careful maintenance allows them to meet their many commitments. This type of ship, often of World War II vintage, is very frequently found in the Amphibious Force. The U.S. Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force has more of these older ships than it does of newer ones. The 20 knot Amphibious Force does not yet exist for the Force. In fact, the maximum speed of most squadrons operating together is often limited to less than 13 knots because of the presence of some vintage ships in company. Many of these ships are faced with mounting materiel and maintenance problems. Add to this the loss of over 90% of their first term enlisted personnel and the problem becomes sizeable. The problem of conversion to new ships will no doubt be solved. It is a matter of time and money. However the solution to the problem of how to retain their most important resource, the sailor, is another question. It is a complex problem. The problem has a complex variable. That variable is man. A solution to the problem of keeping qualified enlisted men in the Navy, particularly from the Amphibious Force, depends primarily on dealing with the enlisted man himself. Since all men can't be persuaded to act alike, nor is such action desired, any solution to the problem can only be partial. The degree of success is dependent on the degree of correctness in diagnosing reasons for the problem and on the problem solving methodology undertaken. The U.S. Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force saw this problem as an internal public relations problem and in early 1965 took steps to solve it. The institution of the Leadership

Career Counseling Program resulted. Discussion of the LCCO program, its objectives and methodology were presented earlier in this study. Following literature research, direct interviews were conducted with a representative sample of all individuals involved in the LCCO program. Each interview, and a compilation of related interview subjects, was presented earlier in this study to report and compare the results of the research.

Interpretation of Research Interviews

In examining and comparing the research findings it seems that two elements should be looked at closely. First, the actual replies the interviewees gave should be studied. These are the "reasons." Secondly, the "reasons" given by one group should be compared with those given by the other. This should help ascertain whether the directors and leaders of the LCCO program are thinking in consonance with the individuals they are attempting to guide or influence.

The first question asked in the enlisted personnel interviews sought to ascertain the reasons why first term enlisted men leave the Navy. As first replies, they gave, in order of prevalence, (1) military restrictions, (2) pay, and (3) "petty stuff"/poor leadership (tie) as the main reasons. The Command-Policymaking group first replies were (1) family separations (2) that the Navy doesn't sell itself, and (3) military restrictions. When secondary reasons were included, the enlisted group cited (1) pay, (2) family separations and (3) military restrictions. The Command-Policy group gave (1) "the Navy doesn't sell itself," (2) family separations and (3) poor leadership. On both first and secondary reasons there is some agreement between the two groups but there is more divergence of opinion than consonance.

On the question of why men re-enlist, the enlisted group gave (1) overall career benefits, (2) job security and (3) the bonus most frequently as a first reply. The Command-Policymaking group gave (1) that the men like the Navy, (2) overall career benefits and (3) job security. Secondary replies indicated the same reasons for both groups. There appeared to be a great deal of consonance between the two groups. The only exception was that the enlisted group placed much heavier emphasis on the Variable Re-enlistment bonus as a re-enlistment incentive.

Seventy percent of the enlisted group said that career information had been presented to them. It was interesting, though coincidental, that 70% of the Command-Policymaking group felt that re-enlisting individuals was the primary goal of the LCCO program.

The prevalence of the re-enlistment bonus incentive was noted again when it was given most often by the enlisted group as the primary advantage of re-enlisting. As mentioned previously, the bonus does not appear to carry as much weight as a re-enlistment incentive with the Command-Policymaking group.

In asking the enlisted group for the primary disadvantage of re-enlisting the question sought to check on the earlier question of why men don't re-enlist. The most frequent reply was family separations. This substantiated the earlier replies. Military restrictions and policy changes followed as the most frequently given responses.

In replying to the question of what the Navy could offer to the individual to re-enlist it was significant that less than half said they would not re-enlist. While others would not comment or didn't know, 21 of the 58 interviewees, or 42% indicated they would seriously consider re-enlisting if certain conditions were met. It was significant that most of the conditions could be met under existing programs within the

Navy. It appeared that many of these men did not know there were existing means of attaining these wishes. It appears that there could be a sizeable percentage of first-term enlisted personnel in the Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force who are not aware of some existing re-enlistment incentives. In any event, 42% of the sample were in the position of being undecided about re-enlisting but not unfavorable inclined to re-enlist if certain requests would be honored. In most cases these requests were reasonable and approval was possible under existing programs and regulations.

The final question asked the enlisted individual if the Navy had helped him or let him down. The 86% "helped" response compared to the 44% "let down" response seems to indicate that the Navy has favorably impressed many more individuals than it has alienated. Most favorable respondents felt the Navy had helped educate them or mature them. Most were favorably impressed with the experience of being in the Navy. It appears that this reinforces the supposition that there may be a significant percentage of individuals favorably disposed towards the Navy and a possible Navy career, who eventually do not re-enlist. However, the 44% who felt the Navy had let them down in some way cannot be overlooked. They represent a sizeable percentage of individuals who may not be favorably disposed toward anything to do with the Navy. These individuals have the potential to influence others and their activities along those lines could help change the attitude of others. Many of the "let down" individuals cited the failure of the Navy to keep its word and misinformation presented by recruiters as the prime reasons for their attitude. Promises of schools, choice of duty and change of duty that never materialized were often mentioned in backing these charges. Regardless of the veracity of the charges, such charges, when publicized, create

a certain credibility gap for the Navy. It can be especially critical on a ship or even within a squadron or Force because of the relatively confining environment. The enlisted man's communication channels in this compact society are reliable and rapid. They function as effectively whether they carry information or misinformation. Therefore a credibility gap in this type of communications system can be especially serious.

Of the Command-Policymaking group 13 definitely felt that the LCCO program served the needs of the sailor either as a re-enlistment program or as a career information program. This represents approximately 56% of the group. While several interviewees did not answer because they were not directly involved in the operation of the program (Bureau of Naval Personnel school instructors) or because time limitations prevented asking one interviewee, it seems significant that approximately 25% of the group would not comment or said they did not know. This could indicate that 25% of the group feel the program is not as effective as it could be or have some other reservations about it.

The final question asked the Command-Policymaking group to give strong and weak points of the LCCO program. Sixteen of the 23 responded with strong points. The two major strong points were that the program provided career information to the sailor and that the use of enlisted counselors let the enlisted man talk on equal footing with the counselor. Seven interviewees either did not respond or gave qualifying answers. The most frequent qualifying answer was that the success of the program depended on command support. This recurring comment indicated that regardless of how organized and emphasized the LCCO program is by the Amphibious Force Command a substantial number of personnel believe that the ultimate success or failure of the LCCO program depends on the backing given by the Commanding Officer in each individual unit.

For weak points only 5 respondees gave a direct answer to the question such as that the program by-passes the division officer or that the program uses unqualified counselors. Four did not comment, gave an unrelated answer, or said the program had no weak points. However 13 interviewees again gave qualified replies. Of these, seven felt that there wasn't enough time available to adequately administer the program. Heavy work loads and operational commitments in many instances eliminates the time required to properly carry out the program. This is not a weakness in the program itself, but it does definitely weaken the chances of the program succeeding. The other 6 respondees again qualified their replies by saying that if command support is weak then the program will be weak. There appears to be an implication in these replies that there are commanders who do not support the program and that, regardless of other factors, unless the commander backs the program it has little chance of succeeding. Regardless of the reasons why some commanders may not support the program the research indicates that command support is a vital ingredient in a success formula for the program.

Interpretation of the Test Results

The twelve question multiple-choice/true and false test administered to each enlisted interviewee sought to measure the interviewees knowledge of some basic career benefits and re-enlistment incentives. These benefits and re-enlistment incentives are subjects which are stressed in the training courses for enlisted counselors and Leadership Career Counseling Officers. They are subjects which would be discussed with first term enlisted personnel as part of the LCCO Program.

Test results indicated that the first term sailor answered the questions on the Variable Re-enlistment Bonus and the STAR Program (Selective training and Retention) correctly most often. Approximately three out of

four men knew the correct answer. On all other subjects, except for Dependency Compensation benefits, approximately half of the test sample answered the questions correctly. However only one out of 10 answered the Dependency Compensation question correctly. STAR and NESEP (Navy Enlisted Scientific Education Program) are both education programs. However 20% more men answered the STAR question correctly than the NESEP question. This may indicate that the enlisted man is more interested in the special training and advancement in rating opportunities through STAR than in gaining a four year college education and an officer commission through NESEP. However, it is probable that more men know about STAR because more are eligible for it and it is stressed more by counselors.

Half of the individuals answered the SCORE (Selective Conversion and Retention) question correctly. This also seems to indicate that half of the sample did not know that the Navy has a program which affords a sailor the opportunity to change his rate.

The questions on Dependency Compensation and Death Gratuity sought to determine the individual's knowledge of survivor benefits. Fifty percent of the sample answered the Death Gratuity payment question correctly yet only 10% knew the sum of the Dependency Compensation payment. The relatively low score on the one and the very low score on the other survivor benefit question might be due to a disinterest in the subject because of the relatively young age of the sample. The average age of the sample was 21.06 years. However it would be expected that the married men in the sample would score better than the single men because of their added responsibilities as head of a family. However of the 14 married men (28%) in the sample only 2 (15%) answered the Dependency Compensation question correctly and 7 (50%) answered the Death Gratuity

question correctly. There appears to be very little difference between the single and married man's knowledge of survivor benefits.

Slightly over half (58%) of the sample answered the question on Duty Assignment Options correctly. It was noted in the interviews that many individuals desired an opportunity to change their duty station. This re-enlistment incentive guarantees a choice of next duty assignment as part of the re-enlistment contract. The test results indicate that there may be some individuals who would be interested in the benefits of this program but do not know about it.

If the test sample is representative of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force first term enlisted population it appears that about 75% are knowledgeable about the Variable Re-enlistment Bonus incentive and the STAR program, about 60% know about the Duty Assignment Option incentive, about 55% are familiar with the NESEP program, about 50% know about the SCORE Program and some survivor benefits, and about 10% know what their dependents compensation would be should they die.

If the test results are converted into interests of the individual according to scores it would appear that of the subjects discussed first term enlisted men are most interested in the following incentives and benefits:

1. Re-enlistment bonuses, (pay).
2. Enlisted school training and advancement opportunities in rate.
3. Change of duty incentives.
4. College education and commission opportunities.
5. Change in rating programs.
6. Survivor's benefits.

Observations

During the course of investigation the investigator observed some aspects of the LCCO program which are not necessarily substantiated by the research. However, these observations are presented as general information and represent the personal opinion of the investigator. They should not be construed as deduced results of the research. These observations are:

1. There appears to be a variance in the degree of acceptance of the LCCO program within the Amphibious Force at the Command and Staff level. Some take the program seriously and appear to be trying to make it work. Others appear to be merely paying it lip service, if not actually opposing it. However the majority appear to be somewhere in between. There appears to be a "semi-stress" attitude about the program by some individuals at the Command and Staff level.

2. Some of the instructions concerning the program at Group, Squadron and ship level seem wordy and vague. It seems that for best results the program should operate from one clear, concise instruction originated at the Force level. Additional instructions at the Group and Squadron level seem to confuse the issue. In addition it seems to add paperwork to require ships to submit copies of NAVPERS 736 interview reports to Squadron and Group staffs. It seems the program should operate with a minimum of obstacles since it is being added to an already busy schedule of events for each ship. The straighter the lines of communication between top and bottom the better the program should work.

3. The program seems to be used as a substitution for qualified division officers.

4. A high percentage of junior officers aboard amphibious ships are OCS (Officer Candidate School) commissioned officers. There appears to

be only a small percentage of U.S. Naval Academy graduates and NROTC Commissioned officers aboard these ships. Most of the officers are reserve officers. Most of them do not intend to remain in the Navy and some make this fact well known to those about them, including the enlisted men serving under them. In some instances the LCCO program is attempting to do the job that a good division officer would do, while at the same time trying to overcome obstacles created by poor division officers. The general non-career attitude of many Amphibious Force junior officers, whether expressed or not, may have a bearing on career attitudes formed by enlisted personnel and upon acceptance of the internal public relations program designed to improve retention.

5. The LCCO officer duty in some instances is simply another title given to an officer with a long list of other collateral duties. Interest and activity in that particular duty increases when an inspection is expected or when the Commanding Officer or Executive Officer show particular interest in it.

6. The best organized programs appear to be in ships where an intelligent, interested, well informed petty officer serves nearly full-time in the job and is the primary workman. A strong, enthusiastic, well organized leader at the senior petty officer level, with command support, seems to get the best results. One of the other main features in these well organized programs was the availability of a quiet, private area in which counselors can conduct interviews and where the individual can come to find career information. The areas often resembled miniature libraries.

7. Heavy workloads and operational commitments are the usual reasons given for not being able to give the program adequate attention. The claims seem to have veracity in many instances.

8. Some senior officers aboard ship feel that the staffs do not really understand their problems. They feel that if they did they would not expect them to carry out the LCCO program as it is now set-up. They indicate they just don't have the time or men.

9. There appears to be a significant number of enlisted men who simply do not trust the Navy. They feel that the Navy will use them as it sees fit regardless of their "reasonable" personal desires. Many feel that the Navy simply will not keep promises if it doesn't serve her purposes. There are many references made to promises made by recruiters that have not been met. It would appear that much of this is misunderstanding on the part of the young sailor. However it also appears that there may be a need for greater clarification in the recruiting service. If it is true that some recruiters meet their quotas by misrepresentation or implication then it is truly a disservice to the individual and the Navy. In the long run it is probably the cause for loss of many more men than expected.

10. Only one individual mentioned "patriotism" as a reason for staying in the Navy.

11. There was no talk of "Navy tradition." The traditions of the old Navy do not seem to exist for the young sailor. On any event, they do not talk about tradition.

12. There appear to be groups of opinion leaders within the enlisted structure who influence the young sailor to leave the Navy. They seem to operate at several levels. One group is made up of men on their second or later enlistment, usually an E-4 or E-5 who has failed to advance in rating. He is often in the Deck Department or Engineering Department in a non-critical rate. This "career" man adversely influences the younger enlisted man with his downgrading talk about the Navy. The

reasons for his criticism are not clear. They could be the subject of further study. He is usually referred to as a petty officer who "bad mouths" the Navy. He is probably the sailor that the other sailors say is the man "who stays in the Navy because he can't make it on the outside" or "for security." In any event he appears to attempt to influence the first term enlisted men.

Another group of opinion leaders seems to be the E-3 or E-4 first term enlisted man who has been on the same ship for several years. He is usually in a non-critical rate. The BM3 or BMSN nearing the end of his enlistment typifies this individual. He appears to lead a small group of younger sailors in his division. He is often the senior man assigned to lead division work details. He is usually a boisterous individual, somewhat arrogant, seemingly of average or below average intelligence, distasteful of authority, but not disobedient, single, the leader of the group on liberty, and a continuous fault-finder with superiors and the Navy. He offers no solution to problems other than that the best thing to do is to get out of the Navy. His talk appears to influence the younger, more impressionable sailors who often become supporters of his anti-Navy attitudes--at least verbally. It appears that these groups form commitments against a Navy career fairly early in their enlistments. They find it difficult to disassociate themselves from the commitment later. To do so would cause loss of identity with their group, possible ridicule from them, and embarrassment in front of others to whom they had previously espoused their anti-Navy feelings. The result seems to be the development of a mass "follow the leader" chain whose goal is to get out of the Navy.

13. There appear to be petty officers in the Navy on second or later enlistments who do not like the Navy and do not want to be in

the Navy. They stay in the Navy because they feel they have to support families, because they feel they can't succeed somewhere else, for retirement benefits or for a variety of other reasons. However, some of these multi-re-enlistees talk down the Navy which may influence the younger sailor.

14. The comment "There is too much Mickey Mouse business in the Navy" is one that is heard often. It seems that it may be one of the main reasons for discontent in the Navy, especially aboard ships. The phrase covers a variety of petty grievances experienced by the sailor. They are continuing, day to day irritations. The phrase "Mickey Mouse business" includes the undertaking of unnecessary work and projects to satisfy the whims of an individual. They are usually "crash" projects such as preparing the ship for the visit of an admiral or other dignitary which usually never materializes. It includes child-like disciplinary procedures, including threats of, and use of, mass punishment for minor infractions. It includes personality conflicts with superiors. It includes petty harrassment by petty officers and officers. It includes doing and redoing seemingly nonessential paperwork. It includes working extra hours on projects that could be accomplished during normal working hours. It includes changing of policy, especially on liberty policy. It includes variance in disciplinary procedures between departments in the same ship. It includes frequent changing of work priorities. It includes having to follow through on mistakes made by junior officers who show little enthusiasm for the job or the Navy. It includes following through on jobs whose procedures are outlined by hard-line mustang officers (officers rising through the ranks) who may show little concern for personal feelings. It includes seeming loss of identity as an individual. It

includes what sailors term "loss of freedom." It includes a wide variety of seemingly minor irritations that carry on over a long period of time and eventually develop into an unacceptable everyday situation to the sailor. He becomes fed-up with continual minor irritations and pettiness. It becomes a major problem to the sailor. The problem is conveyed between sailors and becomes a daily topic of conversation. It can become a major problem for the majority of the crew. An atmosphere of negativism can develop. The "Mickey Mouse" business tends to bind them together against an individual, a ship, or the Navy.

15. There appears to be a lack of communication between the enlisted man and his superiors in many instances. Too often it seems that men are called upon to do things without explanation. Granted that military orders do not need explanation, it appears that cooperation might be improved if the reasons for doing things are made known when they do not conflict with security or discipline requirements. This lack of explanations amounts to blocks in communication. These blocks seem to be in the middle of the communication chain, particularly at the petty officer and division officer level. Occasionally, and possibly most seriously, they occur at the Department Head level.

16. The LCCO program is an ambitious internal public relations program. It has a great deal of potential and nearly as many possible pitfalls. The fact that it was initiated and is operating indicates the high level interest in the program. The fact that some ships have well organized programs with interested and qualified counselors talking with the sailors indicates that good internal public relations is being produced by some units of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force. However, it appears that other ships lack command interest, do not have qualified or interested officers or counselors and are not producing good

internal public relations. Rather, they are merely going through the motions. It appears that the three primary necessities upon which the success of this internal public relations program hinge are:

- a. Command interest and backing.
- b. Qualified and interested counselors
- c. Communication between all interested parties

Re-enlistment rates as of 1967

A review of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet re-enlistment rates covering the period from July 1, 1966 through May 31, 1967 indicate that the first term re-enlistment rate is 9%.³⁰ This represents an increase in first term re-enlistments by 2% since this study was initiated.

Recommendations

It is recommended that the following actions be taken:

1. Continue to operate the LCCO program with emphasis placed on developing more command interest, more qualified counselors and more efficient internal communications.
2. Continue to carry out the recommendations of the Alford Board and publicize that information throughout the Navy, especially at the lower enlisted level.
3. Get staff members concerned with the LCCO program out of their offices and into the ships for sufficient periods to allow them to become well acquainted with shipboard programs and problems.
4. Investigate the possibility of retaining a Psychology team to investigate the re-enlistment problem.

³⁰U.S. Navy. Commander Amphibious Force Atlantic Fleet Notice 1133, July 11, 1967.

5. Investigate the possibility of retaining a Public Relations firm to study the Navy's internal public relations program and make recommendations on how to sell the Navy to its members.

6. Practice good communications. Follow the advice of the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, " . . . I'm a firm believer in passing the word, for this is the only way we can work as a team -- when everybody knows what we are doing and why . . . I have found that many of our problems can be traced to a simple lack of communication."³¹

³¹Moorer, Thomas H., "From the Front Office," Washington: September 4, 1967.

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